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CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

ALBANIA

Berisha Meets North Atlantic Assembly Delegation *[Tirana Radio]* 1
State Provides Help To Develop Agriculture *[ATA]* 1

BULGARIA

Zhelev Pressure on Interior Minister Denied *[BTA]* 2
Karabashev To Sign Agreements in Latin America *[BTA]* 2
Russia Agrees To Help Update MiG Fighters *[24 CHASA 6 Sep]* 2
SDS-Affiliated Democratic Forum Congress Ends *[BTA]* 3
Government Economic Policy Viewed as Failure *[KONTINENT 8 Sep]* 3
Zhelev Adviser Suspected of 'Special Connections' *[KONTINENT 8 Sep]* 4

CZECH REPUBLIC

Havel Interviewed on Government Situation *[Prague Radio]* 5
Havel Opposes Banning Politicians From Business *[CTK]* 6
Supports Jewish Property Restitution *[CTK]* 6
Opposes Making Visegrad Institution *[CTK]* 7
Dyba Outlines Economic Performance at Conference *[CTK]* 7
Ruml Discusses Interior Ministry Situation *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 7 Sep]* 7
Minister's Agricultural Program Criticized *[CTK]* 10
Left Bloc, KDU-CSL Support Official's Dismissal *[CTK]* 10
KDU-CSL Appreciates Unions' Absence From Politics *[CTK]* 10
KSCM Against Dialogue With Sudeten Germans *[CTK]* 11
Commentary on Czech Interests in Islamic World *[TELEGRAF 7 Sep]* 11
Rising Crime Rate Leading to Prison Overcrowding *[CTK]* 11
Temelin To Be Comparable to U.S. Plants *[CTK]* 12

SLOVAKIA

Meciar Address on False Reporting, Devaluation *[Bratislava TV]* 13
Moravcik Views Foreign Policy Issues *[NARODNA OBRODA 6 Sep]* 13
Ministry Issues Statement on Treaty With Russia *[NARODNA OBRODA 7 Sep]* 15

HUNGARY

Antall Welcomes Middle East Peace Agreement *[MTI]* 17
Goncz on School Controversy, Early Elections *[Budapest Radio]* 17
Inflation Level Increases by 23 Percent *[MTI]* 17

POLAND

Walesa Receives Chinese Vice Premier *[Warsaw Radio]* 18
Trade Agreement Concluded *[PAP]* 18
Walesa Interviewed on Politics, Press *[NOWA GAZETA 10-12 Sep]* 18
PSL's Pawlak on Economy, State, Elections *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 10 Sep]* 20
BBWR's Olechowski on Forming Cabinet, Policies *[PAP]* 24
Opinion Poll Examines Role of Politicians *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 11-12 Sep]* 24

ROMANIA

Government Statement on Israeli-PLO Accord *[Bucharest Radio]* 26
Iliescu Message Hails Accord *[ROMPRES]* 26
Melescanu Meets With Chinese Foreign Minister *[ADEVARUL 10 Sep]* 26
Melescanu, French Official Hold News Conference *[ROMPRES]* 27
General Police Inspectorate Chief Examines Crime *[ROMPRES]* 27
PUNR-PDSR Dissension Reflects 'True Trend' *[TINERETUL LIBER 3 Sep]* 27
Moldova To Receive 20 Billion Lei Loan, Fuel *[TINERETUL LIBER 4 Sep]* 28
Editorial Doubts Aid Usefulness *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 3 Sep]* 28
Editorial Views Current Fight for Power *[EXPRES MAGAZIN 1-8 Sep]* 29

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

HVO Denies Attacks on UNPROFOR Bases *[Zagreb Radio]* 32
European Branch of SDA Rejects Partitioning *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32
Banja Luka Rebels Claim Proof of Illegal Dealings *[TANJUG]* 32
Maglaj Muslims Attacked From 'All Directions' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32
Attacks by 'Joint Aggressor' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Muslims Attacked by Serbs, Croats *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
Muslims 'Massacre' Croats Near Mostar *[Zagreb Radio]* 34
Muslim, Croat Prisoner Exchange; Attacks Continue *[Zagreb TV]* 34
Bosnian Serbs Report Croat, Muslim Attacks *[TANJUG]* 34
Croat Blockade of Konjic Not Affecting Aid Convoys *[Sarajevo Radio]* 35
Last Three Mosques in Banja Luka Destroyed *[AFP]* 35
Health Care Institute Gives Casualty Figures *[Sarajevo Radio]* 35

CROATIA

Granic Announces Acceptance of 'UN-Brokered' Cease-Fire *[AFP]* 36
RSK Leader Rejects Offer *[TANJUG]* 36
Fierce Fighting Along North Dalmation Front *[TANJUG]* 36
Serbs Say Attacks Continue on Lika Front *[TANJUG]* 36
China's Qian Qichen Arrives for Visit *[Zagreb Radio]* 36
Commentary on Izetbegovic's Territorial Demands *[VECERNJI LIST 3 Sep]* 36

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Simic Comments on Croatian Attack at Krajina *[Belgrade TV]* 38
Wheat Harvest Up 47 Percent From 1992 *[TANJUG]* 38
French Weekly Examines Blockade-Running on Danube
[Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE 20 Aug] 38

Serbia

Seselj, Kostunica Deny Speculations About Coalition *[POLITIKA 2 Sep]* 40
New Opposition Movement With Karadzic Foreseen *[BORBA 8 Sep]* 40
Ministers Discuss 'Economic War' With Montenegro *[BORBA 7 Sep]* 41
Official on New Prices, Trade With Montenegro *[Belgrade TV]* 42

Macedonia

Collapse of Economy Foreseen if Sanctions Continue *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 8 Sep]* 42
Activity of Albanians in Macedonia Viewed *[PODKREPA 8 Sep]* 43

Montenegro

Report on Severe Shortages of Staple Foods *[TANJUG]* 45

Vojvodina

Large Group of Hungarians Seeking To Leave *[Budapest Radio]* 45

Berisha Meets North Atlantic Assembly Delegation

AU1309161293 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] The delegation of the subcommittee for East-West Economic Cooperation of the North Atlantic Assembly that arrived in our country for a three-day visit yesterday, was, this morning, received separately by Mr. Selami, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs and International Relations; Mr. Gjama, chairman of the Commission for Economy and Finance; Foreign Minister Serreqi; and President Berisha.

President Berisha briefed the delegation on developments in the country and stressed Albania's desire to integrate with Europe and Western defense structures. We aim at an ever-closer cooperation with all NATO structures and to become members of this alliance—he stated. President Berisha went on to say that Western defense mechanisms were unprepared for the difficulties and dangers that arose in the former communist countries following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Membership of these countries in the Alliance must be taken seriously into consideration. The NATO umbrella is a guarantee that would help keep under control various nationalisms and their dangerous consequences. The president also stressed that the problems faced by the countries of Eastern Europe should have been tackled with a general plan, similar to the Marshall Plan immediately after World War II.

The Albanian foreign minister, Alfred Serreqi, pointed out at the meeting with the delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly, that the visit was a message that Albania's desire for integration in the world has been welcomed by the international community. Mr. Serreqi mentioned the considerable assistance given by various international institutions to this process of integration, including the North Atlantic Assembly.

The interest of the members of the delegation centered on Albania's relations with its neighbors: Greece, Macedonia, and particularly with Serbia and Montenegro. Minister Serreqi briefed the visitors in detail on Albania's policy toward these countries. He reiterated Albania's position on a solution to the problem of Kosova, stressing that it should be placed under international protection. The Balkan crisis, Mr. Serreqi pointed out, began in Kosova and must be resolved there. The Albanian minister expressed his appreciation for the stand of the international community with regard to this and other problems in former Yugoslavia, but added that it should be more severe. Minister Serreqi pointed out that Macedonia should be a multinational state in which the representation of the Albanians must be taken into consideration and acknowledged. Regarding the recent petrification of Albanian-Greek relations, Mr. Serreqi stressed that the positions raised by the Greek side are nonexistent. Regardless of who wins in the coming elections in Greece, added Mr. Serreqi, it should preserve a European image in its political attitudes, rejecting all nationalist extremes.

The discussions also covered the alliances that have been created and the possibilities of Albania's integration into these alliances. Albania has replaced the former ideological alliances, which were based also on personal interests, Mr. Serreqi stressed, with an open and intensive policy aimed at integration.

State Provides Help To Develop Agriculture

AU1109182093 Tirana ATA in English 1014 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Tirana, September 11 (ATA)—Albanian agriculture has been provided with over 1,500 tractors and 50 combine harvesters in 17 months of the office of the democratic power. As a result the existing mechanic has been renovated by 16.8 percent. The state has allocated about 400 million leks to fund irrigation.

During 1992-1993 the state has provided 50.8 million leks to help the families affected by natural calamities in some areas of Albania.

During the second half of 1993, the state budget plans to provide rural families with 207 million economic aid to cope with the increase of wheat price.

Zhelev Pressure on Interior Minister Denied

AU1309182193 Sofia BTA in English 1559 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 13 (BTA)—At a briefing at the President's Office today, president's national security adviser Rumen Danov denied suggestions in the press last week that the presidential institution exerted pressure for the replacement of Arlin Antonov, director of the National Security Service, by Mr. Danov.

"I'd like to categorically and very clearly declare that neither the presidential institution nor Dr. Zhelev himself have anything to do with the removal of the National Security Service director or with a nomination of a successor," said Mr. Danov. Later on he said the president will take a stand after hearing the arguments of all sides, but the idea to replace the officer and put up another candidate did not come from the institution he heads. It is within the competency of the Interior Ministry and the Council of Ministers, Mr. Danov said.

Talking on the phone with the president today, Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov denied that anyone placed pressure on him in connection with Mr. Antonov's removal, Mr. Danov said. He asked the reporters present who would benefit from implications the president's office tried to control appointments in the special services, adding, "someone would bar outsiders. There've been no outsiders there so far."

Mr. Danov dismissed allegations he aspired to get the job himself as groundless. If he was offered or pressured into the job, he would decline it. At the same time, he expressed a personal opinion doubts about professionalism at the service may be reasonable.

Mr. Antonov has been summoned back from a holiday, president's spokesman Valentin Stoyanov said. He is expected to meet with President Zhelev today or tomorrow. There is no deadline for the president to issue a decree on the matter, the spokesman said.

In a televised interview on September 7, Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said Mr. Antonov would be removed because of breaches of the Law in the service which are, for the most part, due to his incompetent management.

Karabashev To Sign Agreements in Latin America

AU1209152793 Sofia BTA in English 1442 GMT 12 Sep 93

[Text] Sofia, September 12 (BTA)—Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Valentin Karabashev left today on a two-week tour of Latin America. The delegation headed by him will visit Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela and comprises officials of the Ministries of Trade and Finance. It is accompanied by 40 representatives of state and private business, bankers, merchants and producers. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade Valentin Karabashev is expected to sign in Brazil an interstate trade agreement which will regulate hard currency payments between the two states. In Argentina the delegation may sign an agreement on investment protection and a veterinary sanitary agreement. In all three Latin American countries Deputy Prime Minister Karabashev will discuss a number of issues related to avoiding double taxation and the broadening of economic contacts.

We prepared for this tour for a long time and I hope that it will activate Bulgaria's economic contacts with these Latin American states, Mr. Karabashev told the national radio before his departure. He also expressed the hope that many contacts will be established between merchants and producers and that concrete deals will be signed.

Russia Agrees To Help Update MiG Fighters

AU1409095793 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by Lyubomir Denov: "Our Fighters Are To Be Equipped With Superradars"]

[Text] Following our military delegation's visit to Moscow, Deputy Defense Minister Khristo Tomov announced that Russia will probably purchase products from our military-industrial complex.

Bulgaria will fit the new "Lance" ["Kopie"] superradar in our outdated MiG-21 fighters. This became clear following the negotiations that our delegation had with the management of the MiG factory in Moscow. Academician Rostislav Belyakov, chief designer at the MiG plant, claims that this updating will increase the aircraft's combat effectiveness by a factor of five. This is the only alternative for the elderly fighters, whose engines still have a long useful life, in Belyakov's opinion.

At the moment the Defense Ministry has no funds available to buy either the MiG-29M, which is a completely new aircraft, or the MiG-31 or Su-27, Khristo Tomov said after visiting the international air show in Moscow. In his view, updating of the MiG-21 is the only way of transfusing new blood into the Bulgarian Air Force.

The Plovdiv aircraft plant will install the new Russian components. This plant has the necessary modern facilities and highly trained specialists.

Aircraft experts consider that the MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft that form part of our Air Force's combat strength have not yet exhausted their possibilities.

The Bulgarian military delegation also reached agreement on modernizing our combat helicopters. This will probably be done at the aircraft plant in the Vrazhdebna District of Sofia. Until now, our venerable helicopters

have flown under their own power to St. Petersburg for overhaul, while the helicopters that were not air-worthy rusted in their hangars.

The Defense Ministry may permit itself the luxury of purchasing the latest MiG trainer, fitted with French equipment. This is reportedly the first MiG to be fitted with two engines. The failure of a single engine means certain death for the inexperienced pilot. Over 150 young Russian pilots have been killed in such accidents.

SDS-Affiliated Democratic Forum Congress Ends

AU1209191193 Sofia BTA in English 1732 GMT 12 Sep 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpts] Sofia, September 12 (BTA)—The Second Congress of the Bulgarian Democratic Forum, an anti-communist organization within the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], ended in Sofia today. The congress re-elected Mr. Vasil Zlatarov as chairman of the forum, elected a 75-member National Council and made amendments to the Statutes of the forum. [passage omitted]

The first convention of Crimean Tartars living in Bulgaria was held in the village of Kapinovo (northeastern Bulgaria) today. It was organized by the Asabai Cultural Association of Crimean Tartars based in the town of Silistra (on the Danube). According to the spokesman of the association—Nevzat Yakoub, the convention was attended by 1,500 people from the northeastern parts of Bulgaria. There were also many Tartars from the Romanian cities of Constanta and Medgidia and two Tartar folk ensembles. The spokesman also told journalists that at the next elections the Crimean Tartars living in Bulgaria would put two candidates of their own on the ticket of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

Government Economic Policy Viewed as Failure

AU1409065393 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian p8 Sep 93 p 6

[Article by Ivaylo Kutov: "The Failure of the Administration and the Outlines of Dictatorship"]

[Text] The statement of the government leader at the opening of the new political season was no longer characterized by the usual fake optimism. It rather transpired a badly concealed concern about future developments. It also demonstrated his traditional effort of making up for the current anxieties and insecurity by demonstrating his readiness to adopt forcible measures against the protest of the population.

The prime minister is doing the right thing for himself and for those who are supporting him. From an announcement of the National Statistical Institute that was cited by a Sofia daily, we learn that "the most severe drop in production since the beginning of 1993 was registered in June.... and that the period of a gentle decline in production, in domestic trade, and in services that was observed throughout the preceding months is nearly over."

The factual announcement, which is deprived of all emotional and political contexts, is not surprising. Every sober and realistic Bulgarian citizen of average intelligence realizes perfectly that the "downhill trend" has not, by far, been overcome. The enthusiasm with which Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Deputy Stefan Stoilov greeted Berov's government and his encouraging forecasts proved not only premature, but totally wrong.

On the basis of official data and statistics, even people who are totally unfamiliar with economic affairs, understand that the results of the eight-month BSP government were disastrous. This fact is much more significant than the over-emphasized failures of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] cabinet. The budget was submitted and adopted only in the middle of the year. While the country is striving to adjust to it, the government is already talking about the necessity of updating and a respective increase.

As it has long been known, the budget is the mirror of the administration's policies. Everything depends on the budget—whether it carries sufficient revenues from certain sources, and whether it produces visible or future results through its various spheres of expenditure. As far as I understand from the reports of the cabinet members, no promising results have been achieved. The trade balance is also characterized by negative indexes only, at least as far we have learned from reliable sources of information.

Until recently, Luyben Berov, in his text book on economic history, used to indoctrinate his students that "the worldwide economic development following World War II proceeded under the circumstances of the second and third stage of the overall capitalist crisis. Bulgaria and Albania left the capitalist system during the second stage of the overall crisis of capitalism, as a result of the socialist revolutions.... That was characterized by socialist reorganization of the national economy, nationalization of industry, transport, and trade, by cooperativization in agriculture, and so forth.... The socialist system, being in possession of all necessary tools to tame the warmongers of the imperialist camp became a powerful support of world peace." It is really ironic that, today, the same Lyuben Berov has assumed the leadership of a government endorsing privatization under the control of the ex-Communists from the BSP and the ASP [Alternative Socialist Liberal Party].

According to numerous political observers, Mr. Berov who has hardly become a distinguished figure, with demonstrative coolness, shows himself ready to resist any criticism and reprimands. His prevailing ambition is to preserve his post. If society wishes to achieve something slightly better than what we are facing today, it

should rely on the pressure of the BSP, or of the tiny ASP group (consisting of Vasilev, Michkovski, Karabashev, and Bikov).

Nevertheless, the ex-Communists from the BSP and ASP have no personal or group interest in changing the basic status of the present cabinet policy. In trying to postpone early parliamentary elections, they rely on the selfish, domestic interests of numerous other deputies from all parliamentary groups. As far as the ex-Communists and the groups of their close entourage are concerned, privatization is likely to be implemented on the criminal side, under the cover of "mass privatization," while agriculture may continue to starve under the pressure of the socialist cooperative model.

In the final account, the BSP, the ASP, and others are relying on time, which should implement their hope for a dramatic change of things on a local and regional scale. The latter could serve as a pretext for postponing the elections ad infinitum, at least until the beginning of the next century.

If we believe the forecasts of distinguished Western research institutes, the credit for the classical democratic model runs a risk of becoming exhausted before it has been thoroughly planned. Although only temporarily, post-communist Europe may become subject to the influence of the authoritarian alternative, namely to the nostalgia for a "firm hand." No matter how preposterous it may sound today against the background of our Council of Europe membership, such a trend should not be dismissed in the case of Bulgaria. Plenty of formal justifications exist in this respect. Starting with the economic chaos, promoted by the present oligarchy, the dangers of a penetrating Islamic fundamentalism, and, last but not least, the long-suffering argument of the called "explosive situation in the Balkan peninsula" could always provide such a pretext.

People who are interested in the practical implementation of such an hypothesis exist and they are well known. The SDS could be the only alternative for the present administration. At the beginning of the new political season, the SDS coalition should reassess some of its abstract slogans that are only likely to impress the intelligentsia or political idealists. What are required are accelerated actions and an operational program likely to convince the people's masses that bread, prosperity, and jobs can exist under democracy.

Zhelev Adviser Suspected of 'Special Connections'

AU1409065893 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 8 Sep 93 p 6

[Editorial: "Let Us Make It Quite Clear: Who Is the Boss?"]

[Text] The president's adviser, Rumen Danov, is supposed to be the most likely candidate for the post of counterintelligence chief, according to certain newspapers. We are talking about the agency whose current chief, Arlin Antonov, is expected to be dismissed by presidential decree—a fact which is not merely based on newspaper rumors, but has been officially confirmed.

Some time ago, the media reported that the counterintelligence service was in the possession of data about Rumen Danov's quite special connections with representatives of foreign intelligence services.

It might have been a piece of malicious slander aimed against one of the president's favorite advisers.

However, it might also have been a reliable piece of information.

It is possible that Rumen Danov may not be one of the designated candidates for the post of counterintelligence director. Nevertheless, it is also possible that he may replace Arlin Antonov in this post.

Considering that Bulgaria, just like the United States, is a country of unlimited opportunities, this particular case is prompting us to insist on the urgent introduction of the U.S. model of appointing highranking civil servants. A special parliamentary commission should approve or reject the nominees.

As long as we know who the boss is, we also know who is responsible.

Havel Interviewed on Government Situation

LD1209164193 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1215 GMT 12 Sep 93

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by correspondent Petr Stiegler at Lany presidential residence; date not given: "Conversations at Lany"—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Stiegler] Mr. President, there are days when your activities and your work are not in the limelight. This last week has been somewhat different, namely as far as the response to your meeting with Salman Rushdie goes. Following the meeting, you spoke to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and Foreign Affairs Minister Josef Zieleniec. It would appear that you had clarified the matter. Nevertheless, a slightly unpleasant aftertaste has lingered, which seems to have vindicated all those who had complained about a certain lack of coordination in Czech foreign policy. Do you think that it is indeed necessary to clear all misunderstandings and distortions in the communication process [break in transmission], that subsequent statements highlighted?

[Havel] I think that coordination is essential. If it had not always worked or the wires were crossed, it is quite natural and logical. We have a new constitution, a new state. We are building a new constitutional and political system. Relations are only just being established. [passage omitted]

I think it is a very good idea to work out how communication and information should specifically be conveyed. [passage omitted] I therefore, welcome very warmly the idea mooted by Prime Minister Klaus to form a Foreign Policy Council as an advisory body to the government. The president, the parliamentary speaker, and the chairman of the parliament's Foreign Committee, I am told, would be automatically invited. I think this would be just the right platform to discuss foreign policy continuously. All the coalition parties would, of course, have to be in the council; I think it is a very good idea. Moreover, it would also be very important for the chairmen of the four main coalition parties to discuss foreign policy among themselves.

[Stiegler] [Passage omitted] Mr. President, this week you also commented on the Sudeten German debate. You unequivocally backed the policy of the cabinet, that excludes the possibility of any kind of return of property. You have, nevertheless, stated that it would be good to conduct a dialogue on all issues. Do you think such a dialogue should be conducted by totally independent experts—historians, scientists—or do you think the Coalition Commission, which is being mentioned so frequently, would have any prospects?

[Havel] I think that it should be a group that will act on the basis of some kind of authorization from the political power—in our case it is the government coalition. At the same time, it is not at the given moment, important what kind of function one person or the other would have in the commission. It is important that the people are knowledgeable in that field.

What is more important than who should be a member of such a group is the purpose of the group, and I think that as long as there is such a live, serious problem here, which has its deep historical roots, we cannot keep beating about the bush and refuse to speak about it. We may have a very different stance on many specific points of the problem than our partners, but that is not a reason for not talking with them about it; that is more a reason to talk about it with them, to clarify our stances, to try to analyze the past jointly—what was first, what came later, what was the consequence, what was better, what was worse in the deeds of our ancestors, so to speak. That would help to clarify the atmosphere, blow out the cobwebs.

That would not necessarily mean that we would have to reach some kind of specific decisions that would make one or the other side change its points of departure. I actually do not think that such a working group should have the power to adopt any kind of decisions. It could, at the most, inform the government and constitutional bodies on the course of the talks, and it would be up to the government to decide whether it wants to follow the recommendations or not.

[Stiegler] The German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said, among other things, that the right time to compensate transferred or expelled Germans had perhaps not yet come. [passage omitted] How do you interpret this statement?

[Havel] It is truly unthinkable that after 45 years, or 50 years on in five years' time—an owner of today would be expropriated because of historical events which passed long ago. This is quite absurd. [passage omitted]

It seems that, if anything, with rapid integration of the EC and the adoption of its standards, whereby citizens and capital can move freely, those who feel something for this country, as did their ancestors, could settle here or engage in business. This seems to be the only feasible solution today.

[Stiegler] Mr. President, this week you have also spoken in favor of returning Jewish property to the Jewish communities, and said that the transfer must observe correct legal steps, and at the same time be dignified. How, concretely, do you think this should be done?

[Havel] That is more properly a matter for lawyers. I do not know exactly. I, as somebody who is not a lawyer, think that the simplest solution would be to adopt a law reciting the facts, according to which the state, or towns, or villages, would transfer the property [in question] to Jewish communities. There are not very many of these properties; they were listed quite some time ago. It should really be an independent law, since it would not be a good idea to link the matter to restitution, because this is not a normal [case of] restitution. The property

was actually returned to the communities immediately after the war but the decision was never carried out. It was then confiscated once more by the Communist regime, and in the meantime many of the buildings have changed owners, have become dilapidated, etc. That is why an enumeration is needed.

No matter what the decision will be, it is possible to imagine other administrative ways of doing it. In any case, it should be done in a dignified manner, because I do not like the idea that the state should sell the property to the Jewish communities for a symbolical price. I do not like the idea—not because the Jewish communities could not pay the one koruna required, but because something that has been stolen twice—once by the Nazis and the second time by the Communists—should be sold by the democratic state to those from whom it had been stolen, seems wrong to me.

[Stiegler] Do you intend to commit yourself in this respect?

[Havel] I probably cannot do more than speak about it with politicians, parliamentary representatives, representatives of government parties, to voice my view—and, by the way, I have repeatedly done just that.

[Stiegler] Mr. President, although we are still in September, a date that was very significant for the whole population of Czechoslovakia is approaching and now, maybe, many of the people do not know whether 28 October should be celebrated or not.

[Havel] I, personally, think that 28 October should be the national holiday of the Czech Republic, and I have brought this up several times with various politicians. I told them about my view and I must say that most of them shared it. We must realize that a national holiday is a day that is usually linked to some kind of positive popular action, a positive demonstration by citizens. In our modern history such a crossroad was, truly, 28 October [1918]. It is the day when we remember the birth of a democratic, independent state. It is true that the state which emerged on that day was Czechoslovakia and today we are the Czech Republic, but the content of the day is not only the fact whether we are a two-national or single-national state, but also our accession to democracy, to certain humanistic values, to certain traditions. Our constitution actually says that we pledge to uphold all the good traditions of Czechoslovak statehood, and I think that the Czech Republic has a legitimate claim to commemorate this day, just as the Slovak Republic has this claim, should it want to.

On the whole, I do not think it would be right, namely at this point of time, when we are living in a new state, to underestimate the significance of state symbols, or the symbols of statehood, as national holidays, decorations, etc. These are things that contribute to a certain kind of integration of society, to what we need so much at our time—the existence of the feeling of belonging, feeling of a common task, not to let it be drowned in the different opinions that exist in a democracy, especially in a new democracy, between individual political streams, individuals, etc. [passage omitted]

Havel Opposes Banning Politicians From Business

AU1309131493 Prague CTK in English 2005 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—The draft law on conflict of interest should prevent politicians from getting rich through their political positions, Czech President Vaclav Havel told journalists today.

Havel believes that the law should not ban politicians from doing business. Business is no shame, and the parliament can only benefit from a successful businessman who becomes a deputy, stressed Havel.

Asked whether he would insist that parliament pass the bill, Havel answered that this was not his habit. He will, however tell the parliamentary representatives his view that it would be good for a relevant legal norm to be enacted.

It was important that the parliament approve the remaining three justices of the Constitutional Court and to adopt laws regarding the Czech Republic's administrative division and restitution of church property, said Havel.

Supports Jewish Property Restitution

AU1309134493 Prague CTK in English 1644 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—Jewish property must be placed under the administration of the Jewish community, said Czech President Vaclav Havel at a press conference today.

A resolution to this effect was passed after the war, Havel said, but was never carried out. The method of returning property to Jewish hands must be legally clean, but also dignified, he said. I do not consider it especially dignified to return this property to the Jewish community by selling it for the symbolic sum of one crown as has been proposed, he said.

Most Jewish property was expropriated by the Nazis, i.e. before February 25, 1948 (when the communists seized power in Czechoslovakia), the date set by the government as a deadline for restitution.

Havel said that at his meeting with coalition representatives this Friday [10 September] he wanted to discuss the restitution of church property, noting that in discussing this question it should not be forgotten that through the centuries the church has helped create culture and civilisation in this country and has significantly participated in the creation of the civilised values which support society.

The churches are legal persons like any other. At the same time, however, they are something more, he said.

Previously, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus said that his Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was opposed to comprehensive property restitution to churches, because the law on restitution speaks about physical persons only.

Opposes Making Visegrad Institution

AU1309173893 Prague CTK in English 2132 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—The sense of cooperation between the countries of the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) is changing at present and it is necessary for it to find a new identity, Czech President Vaclav Havel told journalists today.

The Visegrad Four should not be an institution, but more of a space for cooperation in the economic and political spheres, said Havel. It should become a forum for consultations which would not be closed in itself and which would be able to define relations with other neighbouring states, such as Austria and Slovenia, he added.

It is logical that today the cooperation between the participating countries is of a different nature than it was at the time of the foundation of the Visegrad Group, stated Havel. He noted that at that time the group had been extremely important.

It was a tool which helped destroy the Soviet hegemony in Central Europe and abolish the CMEA (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact. It became, at the same time, a clear message for the Western world and the whole democratic world that these countries, whose past had been full of mutual conflicts, were able to cooperate in the new era, said Havel. It was an efficient group and it proved its worth, he added.

The individual countries should enter various integrating structures and groupings only after they mature. They should not wait for one another or envy one another, said Havel.

Havel does not share Polish Premier Hana Suchocka's idea about the creation of groups alternative to NATO in Central Europe.

Havel noted that the admission of the individual countries to NATO need not and probably would not take place immediately, but it was possible to consider the stages of the admission.

He expressed his conviction that the NATO summit to be held early next year would cast light on the issue.

Dyba Outlines Economic Performance at Conference

AU1309131293 Prague CTK in English 2026 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Vienna Sep 9 (CTK)—The Czech Republic does not count on any third way in transforming its economy, and continues to strive for a market economy without adjectives, the APA agency quotes today Czech Economics Minister Karel Dyba as saying at an international conference on financial market.

In a lecture delivered at the Vienna conference, Dyba presented the latest data on the Czech economic miracle, which is comparable to that in Germany in the 1950's, APA reports.

Despite the unfavourable effects in the first half of 1993—the split of Czechoslovakia and big economic recession on the Czech Republic's most important export markets—the inflation in the country might reach a mere 12.1 percent this year. The state budget is expected to end in a surplus, which would create conditions for the reduction of taxes levied on the enterprises in 1994. The hard currency reserves in the Czech banking system now amount to some 5 billion USD. The unemployment rate is only 3.6 percent, a precondition for maintaining the market economy healthy, Dyba is quoted as saying.

The country's industrial output declined by about 4.7 percent in the first half of 1993, but there are no reasons to panic, as the decline was due to the inefficiency of the Slovak economy, which was still the Czech Republic's most important export market, Dyba said.

In his lecture, Dyba called for opening of Western markets, and for removing artificial trade barriers, which hamper or bar the Czech Republic's free access to the markets. He noted that Czech exports increased by 7 percent in 1993, while an increase of 17 percent was registered in imports.

The first phase of the privatisation process has already been completed: Through the coupon method, about 60-70 percent of former state-owned enterprises have been privatised, Dyba is quoted as saying.

Ruml Discusses Interior Ministry Situation

AU1409064993 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Sep 93 p 6

[Interview with Interior Minister Jan Ruml, by Jiri Leschtina and Petr Novacek; place and date not given: "The Interior Ministry's Officials Will Stamp Out the Affairs"]

[Text] Prague—Interior Minister Jan Ruml does not think our citizens should still be afraid of an uncontrollable, omnipotent Interior Ministry. "I think citizens are more likely to be worried about our perplexities than our excessive power and arrogance," said the minister in an interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES. "People do not mind if the Interior Ministry is powerful if they feel it is there to protect them. However, they do mind if they are occasionally made aware of our uncertainty, confusion, or even incompetence, as is sometimes the case—for example—in connection with the recent affairs."

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] It is really strange if you react several days later to the accusation that senior ministry officials—including yourself—are involved in the rum business. Why the hesitation?

[Ruml] From the beginning, we did not want to create the impression among the public that the Ministry's officials are using more authority than is necessary. Our hands are still tied by this ministry's image during the communist era. Therefore, we tried to avoid giving the impression that the current management team is putting pressure on someone, is interfering in the investigation, or is conducting ill-considered purges. We do not want to operate like a high-handed ministry, but like a normal, central body of the state administration.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Do you not think the time has come for you to abandon the tactics of caution and react to such events promptly and expeditiously?

[Ruml] Indeed, our style so far has to be radically changed. It is necessary to draw conclusions immediately and on the spot from such incidents. It is necessary to stamp out affairs at the very beginning and prevent the spread of rumors by precise and prompt action. My deputy, Martin Fendrych, did well when he immediately refuted the public speculation by Social Democratic Party Deputy Gross that he had bought an Interior Ministry recreation center for one tenth of its real price. On the other hand, it was wrong for us to hesitate with the recall of Hradec Senior Commissioner Jadrny. If we had not hesitated, there would have been no suspicion that we want to influence the clarification of the case surrounding the sale of rum. Commissioner Jadrny is, undoubtedly, an expert in criminal investigation. He behaved quite unprofessionally in this case, however, when he allowed a former StB [State Security] operative to appear on television, allegedly in order to verify whether the Interior Ministry's officials were in on something. It would be completely in order if the police president were to recall Jadrny immediately and replace him with someone reliable.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How, in your opinion, do such affairs come about?

[Ruml] Their basis is in fact terribly primitive. One banal issue is wrapped in other banal issues, dramatically distorted information intended to inconvenience someone. An affair started this way then increases in a geometric progression. It is interesting that there is really absolutely nothing in these affairs—just an ordinary offense. Meanwhile, somewhere else, many more serious affairs, which no one is bringing to light, may be being ignored.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] That is all very well, but who concocts these affairs? A second power center, as you put it in TELEGRAF?

[Ruml] I do not think this is the activity of an organized group, but is the work of individuals. Of course, there are people interested in sponging off these affairs, so they create the impression that some sort of organization is involved in them.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Why, then, did you talk about a second police power center in East Bohemia?

[Ruml] This was merely a working concept. I just wanted to say that some areas are more suitable for the outbreak of affairs than others. In East Bohemia, evidently, more of these individuals are to be found. For example, former police officers, who now work for various security firms, were involved in the rum affair and they contacted the case investigator.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Could you tell us something about the gossip surrounding Prague Police Director Pavel Hofman who is—allegedly—the head of a power center in the capital that is, apparently, even linked to the criminal underworld?

[Ruml] In Prague, as in large cities everywhere, the criminal police have informers in the underworld. They would be unable to do their job without them. So, on a general level, you could accuse any police officer of having contacts with criminal elements. The issue involves whether police officers have broken the law. So far, no one has submitted a shred of evidence that Director Hofman has acted at variance with the law.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Despite this, such accusations have been made in the press. Is this not one of those cases when the Ministry should react promptly, this time to the shocking rumors that the most senior police officer in Prague is linked to the mafia?

[Ruml] Here it is necessary to wait for the result of the investigation conducted by the Supreme Control Office. The position of Director Hofman is very strong, because we decided to set up a central police operation in Prague so that the police management could operatively transfer forces from one district of the city to another. For instance, this means that police officers in pursuit of criminals do not have to stop at their district's border. Such reorganization, naturally, causes tension both in the Prague Police Force itself and between its director and the president of the Czech Republic Police Force. The indistinct jurisdiction between the police president and the Prague police director was probably one of the reasons why Hofman's immediate superior has not, so far, come to his defense.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Who, chiefly, decided to increase Director Hofman's jurisdiction?

[Ruml] Following an agreement with all the Prague mayors, I pushed politically for his new jurisdiction. This is an experiment for one year. I had to gain the support of the police president for this idea; he was opposed to it. He was particularly concerned that a new administrative body would evolve in Prague and that the Police Presidium would not be able to cope with it. However, the police president should have a strong

personality, and he has such fundamental jurisdiction at his disposal that he should be able to cope with such a situation.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Would you dare to swear that this society is not at risk from the reversal of democratic conditions—a fatal danger—by the security forces?

[Ruml] I absolutely discount that possibility! On the other hand, I am concerned that our Police Force is too weak and is unable to deal thoroughly with anything in the security sphere.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Hearing something like that from you is like finding out from the agriculture minister that famine will break out in winter....

[Ruml] Of course, the Police Force is not in danger of collapsing, but the fact remains that its officers are incredibly overburdened and often work to the verge of physical and psychological exhaustion. At the same time, we do not have the money to pay their overtime. We have even less for the essential modernization of their equipment. Police work is terribly over-bureaucratized. There are far too few officers, but—in view of the valid laws—they must, for instance, fill out almost the same number of forms when investigating the theft of a rabbit as a case of murder.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] How much money would you need in order to sleep peacefully?

[Ruml] We received more than 15 billion korunas [Kc] this year. According to the most sober estimates, I will need more than Kc20 billion next year. I will campaign indefatigably in the government for such a sum.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You mentioned that reorganization is a source of discontent in the Police Force. How long will it take?

[Ruml] The basic systemic changes will take at least another 18 months. It is possible that this discontent is also feeding off the various affairs. For example, the rumor that all former members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] will be released from the Police Force on the basis of the Anti-Communist Law spread like wildfire through all police structures. That is nonsense.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Can you estimate how many police officers and people employed in the force are loyal to the democratic system and, consequently, to the Interior Ministry and to you?

[Ruml] In the sense that you are asking, almost no one is loyal. It is impossible to expect that the police officers—an overwhelming majority of whom were in the CPCZ and served the Communist Party—will somehow intimately identify themselves with the values and principles of a new regime. This is simply a matter of a change of generation. However, there is another kind of loyalty. Loyalty to their profession and loyalty to police work. I venture to claim that this is intrinsic to a considerable majority of our police officers. Such loyalty simply does not mean that they cannot combat crime in any social system. I have already repeated several times that those people who are now about 45 can stay in the Police Force until they retire.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Have you ever considered what kind of vision to offer these people so that they view their work with something more than cold professionalism?

[Ruml] I think I know what to offer them. If they do their job well, the public's negative attitude toward the Police Force will completely change. They will be officers in an appropriately respected profession and, this way, they will also climb the social ladder.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Let us turn from the street to the Ministry. When selecting your closest colleagues, you are often reproached for giving priority to your friends over experts. Are you really afraid that, at a precise moment, someone will stick a knife in your back?

[Ruml] The issue is not about someone sticking a knife in my back. It is terribly important that people of a high moral caliber occupy the decisive posts in this department. People who want to do a good job, who are incorruptible, and who are simply reliable. These people do not necessarily have to be professionals.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Of course, you thus lay yourself open to the charge that the Interior Ministry is run by amateurs.

[Ruml] Someone who is clean, incorruptible, and—at the same time—greatly interested in this work is not, in my opinion, an amateur. Naturally, there must also be lawyers and other experts among these people. Therefore, I am trying to set up mixed teams in all important offices composed of old professionals and new people.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] You are the minister whose recall is most demanded. In this connection, do you feel you have the support of the government? You declared recently that the cabinet does not show the corresponding interest in the problems facing your department.

[Ruml] I would not say that now. The government has realized the seriousness of the situation. The prime minister has also come to the conclusion that resolving the acute problems within the Interior Ministry cannot be postponed for too long. We must realize that, one day, the voters will require the government to account for what it has done to protect the citizen. I imagine that this will be one of the most important topics of the next election campaign.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Under what circumstances would you consider resigning?

[Ruml] I am well aware that to many people I am a politically controversial figure. Therefore, two months

ago I told Vaclav Klaus that, if I were to become a political burden for the government or the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], I am prepared—at any time and without a scandal—to give up this high-profile post.

[MLADA FRONTA DNES] Does the ODS have a replacement for this high-profile post, a replacement acceptable to the coalition and the public?

[Ruml] Not as far as I know. I would be much more at ease if it did have one.

Minister's Agricultural Program Criticized

AU1309161193 Prague CTK in English 2146 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague, Sep 9 (CTK)—Nobody backed the draft programme for agricultural policy through 1995 proposed by Agricultural Minister Josef Lux at a ministerial meeting on Tuesday [7 September], as the material contravenes the principles of the country's economic orientation, Jan Cerny said at a press conference today.

Cerny chairs the parliamentary Agricultural Committee.

Parliamentary deputy and chairman of the Union of Land Owners and Private Farmers, Vlastimil Tlusty, said that the initial analysis of the present situation in Czech agriculture in Lux's draft programme was structured without regard for individual business subjects. Under the programme, the process of the agricultural reform should be terminated, all non-profiting economic subjects removed, and government policy should strive to maintain the present state, Tlusty said.

The call to increase state subsidies for agriculture is ungrounded, as these subsidies have been distributed in a subjective way, and do not take in account needs following from the sphere's restructuralisation, Tlusty said, adding that the problem could be solved by changing the system of functioning of the Market Regulation Fund and the Guarantee Fund so that the distribution of subsidies improves.

Cerny said that Lux's programme also ran counter to the principles embedded in the election programme of Lux's Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL). The Civic Democratic Party (ODS), of which both Cerny and Tlusty are members, therefore wants to work out its own draft agricultural programme, and submit it at a meeting of the Czech Government coalition four focusing on the issue.

Speaking after the ministerial meeting on Tuesday, Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus told journalists that the ministers had not approved the draft programme because it puts stress on some other targets, ambitions and suppositions than what most economic ministers had in mind.

In a statement given to CTK on Tuesday night, Lux said that the formal aspect of the programme was criticised at the meeting, but the fundamental principles and goals were not challenged.

Left Bloc, KDU-CSL Support Official's Dismissal

AU1309131093 Prague CTK in English 2016 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—At its meeting today, the Czech parliament's Organisational Committee disapproved a suggestion from the Left Bloc (LB) group of deputies that the question of dismissing Prosecutor General Jiri Setina be included in the draft programme of the parliament's September session.

Chairman of the LB group of deputies, Jaroslav Ortman, told journalists that the whole opposition, and the group from the coalition Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) backed the proposal. Ortman said that the LB would propose the discussion on Setina's dismissal again at the opening of the parliamentary session slated for September 14.

Jan Kasal from the KDU-CSL, who is deputy chairman of the parliament, stressed that the KDU-CSL's reasons to back the LB proposal markedly differed from those cited by the LB. We were criticising the Prosecutor's General Office throughout the spring and summer and we believed that the law transforming the office into a State's Attorney's Office would be passed as early as September, Kasal said.

The parliament's September session should discuss a report by the parliamentary body supervising the activities of the Security Information Service (BIS), and hear a report on the security situation in the Czech Republic to be presented by Interior Minister Jan Ruml.

KDU-CSL Appreciates Unions' Absence From Politics

AU1309115093 Prague CTK in English 1221 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—The Christian Democratic Party-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) welcomes the unions' determination to resist politicization and shun certain left-wing parties which are courting them, KDU-CSL Party Chairman Josef Lux said today.

The chairman of KOVO trade union, Jan Uhlir, categorically rejected any possibility of joining the Realistic Bloc on Sep 5. With 800,000 members, KOVO is the largest trade union in the Czech and Moravian Trade Union Chamber (CMKOS). The Realistic Bloc comprises the Liberal Social Union, the Christian Social Union and the Czech Social Democratic Party, whose chairman Milos Zeman spoke on Sep 4 in favour of unions joining.

The best solution to the Setina affair'—surrounding the prosecutor general, Jiri Setina, who allegedly used false

information to acquire the use of an apartment—remains his resignation, party vice-chairman Jan Kasal said.

KDU-CSL members of parliament support the inclusion of the matter in the September session of parliament, although only as a last resort. We would prefer the procurator general to resign, Kasal said.

The KDU-CSL is not convinced that after Setina's dismissal the activities of the Coordination Centre for the Investigation of Communist Crimes should be restricted. On the contrary, the party believes that by creating a normal, reliable working environment the Prosecutor's Office can function as originally intended, Kasal maintained.

KSCM Against Dialogue With Sudeten Germans

AU1309115493 Prague CTK in English 1245 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) believes that the reopening of the question of the so-called expulsion of Sudeten Germans is the most serious problem of today.

KSCM representatives told journalists today that especially Czech President Vaclav Havel's moves in this area harmed the interests of the majority of the Czech Republic's citizens. They emphasised that the KSCM was the only political body which had warned against the reopening of this question from the very beginning.

By speaking about the moral guilt of both sides, Havel cast doubt over the results of World War Two and currently the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft is reaping the benefits of Havel's behaviour, KSCM Chairman Miroslav Grebenicek said.

He said that statements by representatives of the German and Bavarian Governments asking that the Czech Republic's and other East European countries' admission to the European Community (EC) be made conditional on talks with the Sudeten Germans brought into question the recognition of the Sudeten German expulsion from Czechoslovakia after World War Two as an international act and expressed support for Sudeten Germans' property claims.

Some steps taken by German politicians aimed at initiating direct talks between the Czech Government and Sudeten Germans were very dangerous and threatened the Czech Republic's interests, KSCM leaders said. The KSCM considered the buying up of regional newspapers in border regions by German capital and Germany's offer of help in restructuring border areas an attempt at the economic and political subordination of the region, KSCM representatives said.

The KSCM said it appreciated realistic stances and approaches on the part of the government coalition and Czech Premier Vaclav Klaus personally, to the question of talks with Sudeten Germans.

Commentary on Czech Interests in Islamic World

AU1109154893 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 7 Sep 93 p 3

[Commentary by Jiri Polak: "A Highly Controversial Meeting"]

[Text] The powers of the president of the Czech Republic are very restricted compared with those of the president of federal Czechoslovakia. As the last federal president and the first Czech president is one and the same person, it is a commonplace and somewhat cynical pastime to observe how successful Vaclav Havel is in building on the reputation he had won [as federal president] and in continuing to assert major elements of "his own" policy.

In view of his reputation abroad, it was to be expected that the president would be more visible in the sphere of international relations than in domestic policy. That the president's point of view differs from that of representatives of the Czech Government became apparent in the debate on the manner and speed of solving the ethnic conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Havel's support for an air strike against the Serbs even served as a background for the hoax about plans to assassinate our head of state.

Vaclav Havel's meeting on Thursday [2 September] with the British writer Salman Rushdie, whom Islamic fundamentalists have sentenced to death, can be included among the president's highly controversial acts. The only reaction to this meeting so far has come from Czech diplomacy. Vaclav Klaus was the first to dissociate himself from this meeting and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffers emphasize the fact that the meeting came about upon Havel's personal initiative and that it was unofficial. The Czech Embassy in Iran and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are "still only waiting" for negative reactions. Even should no conspicuously negative reactions be forthcoming, the Thursday meeting definitely will not facilitate our politicians' talks on recovering the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia's immobilized assets in the Islamic world and is likely to greatly complicate Czech firms' trade negotiations with Iran and other Islamic countries.

Even though Vaclav Havel explained his meeting chiefly as an expression of personal support for, and solidarity with, a fellow writer, the assessment of the meeting by Havel's other colleagues, namely politicians, will be more important for the world and, so I fear, also for the Czech Republic itself. We shall see.

Rising Crime Rate Leading to Prison Overcrowding

AU1309134093 Prague CTK in English 1647 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—The transfer of several Army and Interior Ministry buildings to the Prison Service should increase the capacity of Czech prisons,

said Prison Service General Director Zdenek Karabec, adding that the number of persons on trial and in prison continued to increase.

Karabec said that as of September 1, a total of 16,017 people were incarcerated in Czech prisons, while the official capacity was only 15,500.

With this transfer of buildings, however, we will increase our capacity to 16,833 by the end of the year, he said. We are capable of keeping up with the growing wave of crimes and the increasing number of persons on trial and in prison.

Karabec also said that the approach of the Czech Government, which has freed up funds for the prison system to convert the newly-acquired property, was positive.

Along with the increase in the number of prisons, Karabec said, the number of Prison Service employees will also increase. Currently some 400 workers are needed and interest in working for the Prison Service is very small. Anyone who wants to work for us is rather, I would say, desperate, someone who cannot find work elsewhere. We are relying on changes in the employment market, he said, adding that it was also necessary to change the form and financial compensation of this work.

Temelin To Be Comparable to U.S. Plants

AU1309140093 Prague CTK in English 2117 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Text] Prague Sep 9 (CTK)—After its completion, the nuclear power station in Temelin, South Bohemia, should be comparable to similar facilities in the USA and Western Europe from both security and technological standpoints, director of the Czech branch of the U.S.-based Westinghouse firm, Gabe Toth, said today.

Speaking at a workshop organised by Westinghouse within the Prague Conference on Radioactive Waste (September 6-9), Toth said that Temelin's operational and security systems, to be supplied by Westinghouse, were identical with those applied to the British nuclear plant Sizewell Wisco to be put into operation next year, 18 months before the planned opening of the plant in Temelin. Before Temelin begins to operate, the environmental impact of this type of power plant will have been analysed in Britain, Toth said.

He stated that the Temelin plant's lifetime has been projected to be some 40 years. It can be prolonged through modernisation by some 20 years, which corresponds to the operators' demands.

Power plants must undergo modernisation, as their technologies become outdated. Security, information and directing systems have developed markedly in the past decade, Toth noted, adding that the Westinghouse company has modernised some 60 power plants throughout the USA.

Meciar Address on False Reporting, Devaluation

LD1209191193 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1710 GMT 12 Sep 93

["Regular" Sunday TV address by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] Good evening, esteemed fellow citizens: Last week another bad piece of news about Slovakia and its leaders flew round Europe. I do not want to point at what is happening in other countries, where nobody blames the governments or prime ministers for what is happening there. I am more upset over the fact that nobody has bothered to verify the genuineness and correctness of the information, yet everybody has commented on it and drawn conclusions.

I am also upset over the fact that a person of such international authority as Simon Wiesenthal, who exerted such enormous effort to collect, literally, details and evidence of fascist crimes, undoubtedly is, does not need—for the second time running within the span of six months—to collect anything relating to Slovakia, and merely pronounces prompt conclusions and judgements. If these are untrue? Who cares—it is [only] Slovakia!

Of course, it is necessary to adopt a clear stance in relation to this information. The talks and consultations in Spisska Nova Ves [northern Slovakia, 3 September] were positive, were in favor of the Romanies, and sought real solutions that would enable us to guarantee human rights, dignity, and living conditions. The views expressed at the talks varied and were very complex. What is more complex, however, is the information that came out. For those who buy information from the news agency of the Czech Republic [CTK], it is a signal pointing at the untrustworthiness of that source and a hint at its practices. If a reporter dares to quote a constitutional body, and puts statements in its mouth that it never made, let the degree of his accountability be measured by the appropriate organs.

At issue is not the unleashing of an anti-human rights campaign or of antidemocratic phenomena, but the right to fulfill the function of defending social interests and social relations. To cast the state and constitutional bodies into doubt for one's egoistic or other aims is simply not permissible. This also is not a new campaign of repression, but we must emphasize to everybody who disparages the state, who disparages its constitutional representatives, that legal norms exist for the enforcement of civic responsibility, for the enforcement of a penalty for such deeds.

The time when we could tolerate such things is gone. Now is the time for accountability for the consequences of one's deeds.

It is not so long that I talked to you about devaluation and about the views and attitudes to it. Most of them were critical, condemning it. They criticized the government and the bank regarding the policy we were pursuing. The whole matter was presented as if the evil IMF ordered us to devalue. We must however, see things in the light that they are done in our interest and to meet our internal needs. By devaluing, we have succeeded in ensuring that the Slovak republic managed to get out of international banking isolation, and that it is seen by international banking circles as a trustworthy partner. This has brought first positive results. It is not merely the loan of $90 million that we received from the IMF; it is not the work that we have begun in order to obtain an even more advantageous loan in 1994, for it is the first big success that we achieved at the European Development Bank for Ziar nad Hronom that guarantees the completion of the modernization of the aluminum manufacturing plant and that provides employment guarantees there. Moreover, the European Bank has had enough confidence to provide it own capital investment in the plant. This is so far the biggest loan we have received.

We can understand development trends that are taking place in a rather controversial complexity, either if they bring positive results, or if they provide negative answers. From the viewpoint of positive achievements of the last few days and weeks, we can assess as an undoubtedly great success, the fact that the currency reserves amassed by the National Bank of Slovakia in the middle of the past week amounted, according to the information I received, to $570 million and that was at the National Bank alone. When we add reserves held by commercial banks we notice a trend of the growth of currency reserves, and there is a prerequisite that by the end of the current year these will have grown markedly even further. This is an answer to all those who put your minds in doubt, and who talk continuously about devaluation. It is a reply also to those who have doubts about the health of our currency and the government's ability to pursue a good economic policy. If we continue to strengthen the foundations of our monetary system, if we continue to improve circulation of money, and we are working on this by ridding enterprises of their debts and tackling the concept of the banking system, credit guarantees and the like, we shall surmount another step on our upward journey in the struggle with economic shortcomings and losses we still have. [passage omitted]

Moravcik Views Foreign Policy Issues

AU1209190793 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Sep 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik "recorded by" an "(apl)"-signed correspondent in Bratislava on 3 September: "Our Political Azimuth Is Unequivocal"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik visited our editorial office on Friday [3 September] to discuss topical Slovak foreign policy issues with our editors. It was apparent from the beginning that the discussion would

not only be limited to the sovereign domain of his department, but that it would also touch upon broader domestic political issues.

[NARODNA OBRODA] It seems that in Slovakia at the moment, the ties between the domestic political scene and foreign policy are quite striking, so much so that many people are wondering where in fact we are heading.

[Moravcik] I consider discussions on whether we are heading toward the East or the West to be absolutely unproductive because orientation toward the East is not being taken into consideration under our conditions. We are interested, first and foremost, in the European context, and our foreign policy is concentrated on this. I would like to return once more to the Russian-Slovak Treaty, which recently led to questions being raised about whether our orientation is really pro-West and whether it will push our state back toward the East. I would like to emphasize that the treaty on cooperation and friendship, as well as the treaty on cooperation between the Defense Ministries, are in fact the first elements in a system for collective security, a system based on CSCE documents. We will not find anything in them that would deviate from the CSCE framework. It is necessary to regard them, first and foremost, as an expression of political will—apart from the aforementioned security aspects—that links us to those who support the current democratic process in Russia and President Yeltsin. The treaty is formulated in such a way that cooperation is only taken into consideration with a democratic Russia.

The so-called European treaty, the Association Agreement with the European Community—which we have already initialed and is now being prepared for signing (on 5 October)—is, however, much more important for our foreign policy orientation. It is really comprehensive and contains many undertakings. It incorporates us unequivocally into West European mechanisms. Apart from this, we have stated our desire to become a future member of NATO, which is quite natural, because economic integration also creates the basis for political and security integration. Our orientation—logically—follows on from this, and all the speculation is unproductive.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Our declared interest in joining Western security structures has, to say the least, been indisputable for some time now. However, how do they perceive our willingness on the Western side, because we can cite at least three statements that raise doubts: Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary will become NATO members; this was repeated by the influential U.S. Senator Lugar and, at the end of last week, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl expressed a similar view.

[Moravcik] Naturally, we also receive all these indications through our representative offices and we assess them. However, I must say that we have never come up against anyone in official quarters who has put forward such a reserved point of view about Slovakia. As far as our entry into the European Community is concerned, we have the Association Agreement. Of course, even after it is signed, no one can give us a guarantee that we will really become EC members. This depends on our domestic policy and to what extent we will be able to create—first and foremost—the economic prerequisites, especially a market economy, for our complete integration into the European Community. And not only that—our economic environment has to be able to compete against the EC countries. After all, the situation that arose in Germany when the former GDR became part of the EC's economic area with all its negative consequences could also arise here.

At this stage, I consider it essential to create the economic prerequisites for our incorporation into the European Community as quickly as possible. Apart from this, of course, it is important for us to show an interest in becoming part of the West European security structures, especially the Western European Union [WEU] and NATO. As far as the statement made by Mr. Kohl is concerned, it is news to me, because I have spoken about this issue with my German counterpart, Minister Kinkel, and he has assured me that Germany is interested in ensuring that the entire Central European region—including Slovakia—is integrated into Western economic and political structures.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Do we not sometimes overestimate the general polite cliches uttered by our Western partners during their visits? When they return home, they conduct analyses that are much more critical and contradictory than the polite comments with which they bolster some of our politicians.

[Moravcik] When I spoke about the points of view expressed by representatives from NATO, the Western European Union, and NATO member countries, I did not mean these polite formulations but rather the regular, official talks. Although we assess Slovakia's position objectively, it would be illogical for the West to deliberately push it aside. Why? The logical analyses lend substance to the conclusion that Slovakia should also be of interest to Western Europe. This also corresponds to our official talks on this subject.

[NARODNA OBRODA] You say that the economy and also, of course, policy should be the main criteria for Slovakia's incorporation. Where in Slovakia—in influential political circles—do you see the dividing line between the policy that contributes to our incorporation and the policy that hinders us in this?

[Moravcik] I must proceed from the official documents of the individual political parties. All the parliamentary parties and movements concur in the fundamental orientation of our foreign policy. I do not know a politician that would present this policy differently.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Nevertheless, this does not only involve official statements; there are also political circles that air their views in the media. For example,

despite the official stance toward the Slovak National Uprising [SNP] or the official denial of continuity with the Slovak State, they are doing the very opposite. They also cast doubt on our democratic development by their stance toward the SNP, a stance recently put forward by a daily regarded—to a certain extent—as a government daily.

[Moravcik] Our incorporation into Western structures is also—understandably—a political issue. This does not only apply to the Council of Europe or the European Community; it also applies to NATO. Although this is a military organization, it is also a political organization aimed, first and foremost, at safeguarding the specific values on which European civilization is founded. Speculation that we would become involved in this organization and create the correct economic conditions for doing so, but, at the same time, establish a different kind of regime here are absurd. From this point of view, the young Slovak state must also establish defense mechanisms against tendencies that objectively harm us. However, I think our society will manage to eliminate them itself without formulating additional institutional measures.

[NARODNA OBRODA] The situation is such that, within the wider Central European context, these tendencies do not only exist in Slovakia but also in Hungary or the Baltic region. In Slovak-Hungarian relations, these reactionary forces are all in the same boat, as if they were directed from a single center. This could disqualify Slovakia and Hungary as potential partners in the eyes of the West. Do you discuss this with the Hungarian side within the broader political framework?

[Moravcik] At the moment, we are discussing the other things we have to deal with first. Discussions within this kind of framework are more likely to be held at an academic and nongovernment level. However, I do not know of any country that would encourage these tendencies. This is associated with the issue of political thinking, and I am not sure whether it comes from the West or the East. If it should come from the East, then, from this point of view, it is also important for us to do everything we can to ensure that democratization continues there.

[NARODNA OBRODA] In diplomatic practice, how are the criteria for diplomats' loyalty defined? Is it acceptable to make public in advance reservations about or suggestions for changes in the posts of ambassador in countries that are important for us?

[Moravcik] In response to the second part of your question: It is very inappropriate and undesirable and, therefore, I immediately expressed my indignation that this had happened. This has no parallel in diplomatic practice, and it damages our relations. It also complicates things for those who make the decisions—in this case, the president—if this information is revealed in advance.

The first part of your question is more complicated. A diplomat cannot presume to publicly express his critical reservations against the government.

[NARODNA OBRODA] Even if they are well-founded?

[Moravcik] Even in this case. This is respected throughout the world. If he wants to express public criticism, he has to leave the diplomatic service. On the other hand, it is, of course, his duty to send critical reports to the ministry via reliable channels.

[NARODNA OBRODA] The sign posts outside towns, the unusual means of recalling an ambassador, and the last-minute changes made to the prepared text of a treaty—none of these things help the young Slovakia's image. In the final analysis, could this not also have repercussions within our republic's six-month "trial" period in the Council of Europe?

[Moravcik] I personally feel it is unfortunate that these sign posts were removed now, although—formally—it was in harmony with the legal code. On the other hand, I am convinced that the reaction by our Hungarian fellow citizens was premature because the deadline for fulfilling the Council of Europe's recommendations has not yet been reached. It is not only a technical issue but also a political one whose significance has intensified and created a hectic political atmosphere in connection with our acceptance into the Council of Europe. The government was really in a difficult situation because, just as there are extreme views among our Hungarian fellow citizens, they can also be found among Slovaks. As far as the sign posts are concerned, we informed the Council of Europe of this in detail and our arguments were accepted with understanding. Our friends who supported us during our entry into the Council of Europe have, however, pointed out that the timing of their removal was unsuitable from a tactical point of view.

Ministry Issues Statement on Treaty With Russia

AU1309202393 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 7 Sep 93 p 3

[Defense Ministry Statement issued in Bratislava on 9 September: "Based on Mutual Advantage"]

[Text] A little more than a week has passed since the first official visit to Slovakia by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. Just as, until then, the public opinion had been stirred by the treaty drafted between the two states, and particularly the eventually omitted Article 4, as rendered by the media, at this time, foreign papers and press agencies in particular are uncomfortable with the Agreement Between the Defense Ministries of the Russian Federation and of the Slovak Republic on Military Cooperation signed on 26 August.

Almost everybody perceives it as a certain resurrection of the former Warsaw Pact, and Slovakia as Moscow's extended springboard to Europe. Nevertheless, the entire issue is different. The signed agreement is not at all

secret and no danger for any country is concealed within it. It is based on generally valid documents of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the CSCE. Similar agreements with an almost identical content have already been signed by the Slovak Defense Ministry with appropriate partner sectors in Austria and Poland, and others are being prepared for signing.

The document signed by Ministers Pavel Grach and Imrich Andrejcak does not preclude our proclaimed orientation towards NATO. It is rather a reflection of the present situation in the military sphere. Any reasonable person will recognize that, at this time, Slovakia cannot afford supplying its Army with modern Western arms systems and military hardware. We must train and maintain combat readiness and preparedness with what we inherited from the former federal army.

It is no secret that the majority of our military hardware is Russian made, and since, because of our lack of finances, we do not expect a major rearmament or modernization of the Army before 2000, the treaty quite logically focuses precisely on this military-technical sphere. It elaborates on supplies of spare parts, special fuels, and lubricants, and repairs of arms and technology. An exchange of military-school students is possible, as is the training of personnel operating certain arms systems. Because the territory of Slovakia is small, the agreement provides room for combat shooting practice for the Air Defense troops and Air Force of the Slovak Republic at ranges in Russia.

The adopted document, which will be in effect for five years and updated by expert commissions annually, is qualitatively on a completely different level from similar documents within the framework of the Warsaw Pact prior to November 1989. The agreement, only a week old, between the armed forces of the two Slavic countries forms an entirely new basis for cooperation, one that does not stem from the dictate of the strongest, but from mutual respect, trust, equality, and the recognition of the interests of both parties to the treaty.

[Signed] Anton Filo, Slovak Defense Ministry spokesman

Antall Welcomes Middle East Peace Agreement

LD1309220093 Budapest MTI in English 1905 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, Sep 13 (MTI)—On behalf of the Hungarian Government, Prime Minister Jozsef Antall expressed his sincere good wishes to Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin and the Israeli Government on the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian memorandum of principle today, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry told MTI today.

In a letter to Rabin, Antall said "Hungary's consistent position declared in a UN forum in 1991 is that, respecting the right of self-determination of all peoples including the Palestinians, it recognizes Zionism as the state-forming philosophy of the Jewish people.

"Hungary was the first of the former Communist countries to re-establish diplomatic ties with Israel. Since it came to power in 1990, the current government has been seriously developing political and economic ties with Israel. We are convinced the Middle East settlement will create entirely new political, security, and economic conditions for Jewish-Arab co-existence in the region. We hope the future vindicates optimists in the Middle East.

"It is symbolically important that this brave step, opening a new era, coincides with the Jewish new year.

"Since Hungary's position on Arab-Israeli reconciliation is based on UN Security Council resolutions, it supports the realization of comprehensive, lasting, and just peace. It believes those inciting hatred must be pushed back so that further peace talks should not be disrupted by hostile acts."

Antall wished Rabin success working for reconciliation.

Goncz on School Controversy, Early Elections

LD1209010493 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1005 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Interview with President Arpad Goncz by correspondent Istvan Wisinger in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] [Wisinger] In Sari, a village halfway between Budapest and Cegled, which belongs to Dabas, the self-government has given the primary school to the church. The majority of the inhabitants do not agree with this. [passage omitted]

[Goncz] [passage omitted] Some facts have to be taken into consideration. The village of Sari was a Slovak nationality locality, which has been preserving its language and culture with praiseworthy persistence. It has one of the not numerous Slovak language schools of the country. [passage omitted]

The situation, that has evolved, causes a lot of harm. It is very difficult to categorize it. One harm is that because it is a Slovak nationality village, there is the possibility of unfavorably influencing the struggle of the Hungarians of Slovak for their rights because this raises questions regarding the credibility of the Hungarian minority policy. [passage omitted]

If this issue cannot be settled within three days, then, like it or not, it will become an international issue. The English press has already dealt with it and it is poisoning Slovak-Hungarian relations. [passage omitted]

[Wisinger] In your opinion, has the election campaign begun? It seems to have begun, though you have not announced when the elections would be held.

[Goncz] I am not sure that a bell will sound at the beginning of the campaign. [passage omitted]

A situation, I say this in quotation marks, is evolving before the campaign. We have this situation now. It sounds strange, but the campaign has started inside the government coalition and not outside it. The parties outside the government coalition are currently in the situation of choosing people for themselves, which is presumably the prelude to people electing them.

[Wisinger] I read in the press that you are going to meet the chairman of the National Election Committee on 20 September. After that, you probably will want to decide on the timing of the elections. When do you want to decide?

[Goncz] It depends entirely on the situation. By all means, I will not decide on the date of the elections until I have talked to those interested and learn what the political situation is like. [passage omitted]

[Wisinger] Do you think early elections are conceivable?

[Goncz] My imagination is extraordinarily vivid. I can imagine anything on earth, except that we hold future elections as in the past. [passage omitted]

Inflation Level Increases by 23 Percent

LD1309111093 Budapest MTI in English 1059 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Budapest, September 13 (MTI)—Prices rose by 23 per cent and average wages by 18 per cent in the first seven months of the year. Lending rates dropped to 25 per cent from last year's 30 per cent. Government experts said consumer prices this year would be 22-23 per cent up on 1992.

This exceeds the 16-19 per cent price rise forecast at the beginning of the year, but not last year's inflation of 23 per cent.

Walesa Receives Chinese Vice Premier

LD1309204593 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1600 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] In the Belweder Palace, President Lech Walesa received Chinese Vice Premier Zou Jiahua, who ends his visit to Poland today.

The talks concentrated on the possibilities for cooperation between the two states. The president said, among other things, that our country is undergoing reforms and we are negotiating relations with Europe and the world. We are deciding about our partners in a free and unrestricted manner. We want to be you partner in many fields, today and in the future. You have great potential, prospects, and possibilities.

Lech Walesa also expressed the hope that the present visit by the Chinese vice premier will be the beginning of more concrete visits by various enterprises and companies at an early date. An agreement on trade and economic relations between Poland and China, the most important feature of which is the most favored nation clause granted by both states, was signed today.

Trade Agreement Concluded

LD1309205293 Warsaw PAP in English 1553 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Warsaw, Sept. 13—Poland and China concluded an agreement on trade and economic relations on Monday. The accord was signed by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Henryk Goryszewski and visiting Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Zou Jiahua.

Poland and China stressed in the accord their will to develop economic and trade relations and agreed to grant each other the status of the most favoured nation. Both sides decided to set up a Polish-Chinese intergovernmental commission for economic and trade cooperation which is to stimulate cooperation between the two countries.

The two countries are to exchange lists of commodities of special importance for Polish-Chinese trade. "We will do this as in the case of a similar list prepared for Russia. I will turn to two hundred largest Polish enterprises to choose products to be put on the list," said Goryszewski.

The Polish deputy prime minister added that his visit to China last June has contributed to the overcoming of China's cautious approach towards Polish trade and economic offer. "It smoothed away difficulties of political nature which appeared in our mutual relations at a certain point." [passage omitted]

Walesa Interviewed on Politics, Press

WS1009140093 Warsaw NOWA GAZETA in Polish 10-12 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with President Lech Walesa by Mieczyslaw Gil and Krzysztof Karwowski; place and date not given: "'I Want To Lead Poland Quietly'—President of the Republic of Poland Lech Walesa Exclusively for NOWA GAZETA"]

[Text] [NOWA GAZETA] Mr. President, Poland has been in a comparatively good situation for the past few years. Our neighbors have been disintegrating and new states have been established. Do you think Poland and the Poles took advantage of this opportunity to build strong state structures?

[Walesa] The question is strong and definite, and very intelligent, too. My answer will not be so strong. While the world admired us, we fought for a new system and for a new Europe. We achieved that and no one can take it away from us. It really was a great achievement, perhaps the greatest one in modern times. However, that is where this issue ends, and hard and strenuous work begins. The important issue is the work itself, how to work under these conditions. Now, let us take a look: Ukraine is larger than Poland, so are Russia, Germany, France; this means that we are no longer so attractive. In time of combat, we were the winners and we shared the victory with others—a European and world victory. However, where the economy is concerned, I do not know how much we can do because our potential is not even comparable to the potential of other states. Therefore, we cannot expect spectacular successes because we simply cannot have them. Hard work will begin and it will last for a long time, I think. We may be frustrated, we may get furious that we have achieved such a victory, but have nothing to show for it? Well, yes, it was a victory, but in a different battle. We were boxing champions; however, in chess there are better players than we are. We must simply resign ourselves to it.

[NOWA GAZETA] We have a special opportunity to build a strong state without bloodshed. Do we, as Poles, appreciate it?

[Walesa] I think we do, if we only continue to observe the rules that have guided us. If only no one grabs a gun, it will be very good. It is a good thing that we are quarreling because this controversy must bear some fruit. It is too bad that now and then we quarrel like uncivilized people; however, I believe that as time passes, our disputes will become more refined.

[NOWA GAZETA] However, time is too precious to lose ...

[Walesa] Just a second. Who is going to take time away from us? I do not think that we are going to be attacked by the Germans, Czechs, or Russians. So there is no danger on this side. Now, can anyone pick up a gun in this situation? Yes, he may, but guns are carried by soldiers and policemen, and they are under the right people. Therefore, the possibility that something may happen is simply out of the question. There will be three of four demonstrations, I suppose. The fifth one will be broken up in a lawful manner, and the sixth one will not take place. I am not afraid of that—I am the president leading Poland quietly, and that is what I will do.

[NOWA GAZETA] Mr. President, is the idea of an eastern NATO still real?

[Walesa] It is only now that everyone has noticed that Walesa was right once again. If the eastern NATO had been established when I proposed it, there would not have been the problem of Yugoslavia or the separation of the Czech Republic from Slovakia. The statute, the first one proposed by me, stated that borders could not be changed, solutions entailing the use of force could not be accepted. Today it is obvious that it was a good idea. Tomorrow it will be even more obvious that it should have been done.

[NOWA GAZETA] In an interview for Katowice Television, you said "make peace with each other." Since the victory of postcommunists is quite possible, do you not think that the time has come for you to make a goodwill gesture toward the scattered Right?

[Walesa] No, I do not think so, because the right must go through a time of cleansing. However, is this the right? They have leftist programs. It is not clear what they are. Shouting will not create a solid right. Therefore, the right needs purging actions, failures and victories, in order to be really strong. Perhaps I will have to form such a right? If so, then certainly much later.

[NOWA GAZETA] If the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] wins the elections, will you agree for a man of communist origins to be prime minister?

[Walesa] There is democracy in Poland. If 50 percent of the Poles support communists, I will not be able to do anything. I simply do not have a choice. Everyone would have to make an unequivocal decision. Therefore, let us wait. Democracy has its rules and we must respect them. If communism is what the nation wants, then neither you, nor I, nor anyone else can say no. Now, there will be people who will not go to the polls. Those who do not go, will vote for the winners.

[NOWA GAZETA] In yesterday's interview for the Polish Press Agency [PAP], you said, more or less, that the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] did not meet your expectations. Can you explain what exactly...

[Walesa] Excuse me, but this is not what I said...

[NOWA GAZETA] The bloc did not fully meet your...

[Walesa] This is not what I said. I said that if I were more involved in BBWR, if I treated it as a presidential party, then I would certainly propose to make a few changes. However, this should not be interpreted as my being against it. BBWR has proposed good programs, it has certain ideas, good people, and should receive many votes, because it is really indispensable to Poland.

[NOWA GAZETA] Mr. President, in the slogan that you so often repeat: "Take things into your own hands" there is one fundamental problem: economic conditions. Not everyone has an economic opportunity to take things into his own hands. Can you still see the possibility of distributing national property among the people so that they can take things into their own hands?

[Walesa] We live in a democracy; democracy demands that we take things into our own hands, because these are its rules. Therefore, I have not made a great discovery here. I encouraged greater participation in various areas of life. I called it "taking things in one's own hands." This stems from democracy, from pluralism. Certainly, it is most conspicuous when the economic segment is taken into someone's own hands. I would like to stress that here there has been great transformation [as published] toward privatizing. I would like a greater commitment in this area. I would like these problems to be solved better and more wisely. I would not like any thievery. In this area, I would like greater participation of the people in this process of taking things into one's own hands. People should also watch whether this process is being implemented correctly. However, I did not mean only this when I was talking about taking things in one's own hands. I was also talking about politics, the rule of the law, as well as many other issues.

[NOWA GAZETA] Your attitude toward many press activities, toward the shape of this press, and toward the method of informing, is rather critical. At the same time the press is in the hands of people who can see an interest other than the common interest. Can you comment on this? Is there a chance of having a different, new press?

[Walesa] There was no other alternative to what happened. I was the leader when the communists lost power. We had to take over the press, as well as almost everything else. However, there was no other apparatus other than the existing one, so we took it over. I always hoped that pluralism would first be constructed from the bottom, that parties and economic groups would be established, that they would buy out the press from those who bought temporarily. This is already happening—look at all the papers that collapse; however, in the meantime other papers have turned up. All this is proceeding too slowly and that is why we have such problems with the press. The press is not interesting. I wish your paper all the best; however, it must be more interesting. It does not have to be a drum, which it happens to be. I know that you are only just beginning; this is why I will say again that I wish you all the best and I hope that...

[NOWA GAZETA] There are, however, economic considerations.

[Walesa] Well, no, you simply need enthusiasts. Enthusiasts who will do things in a more interesting manner and in a shorter time—people are rather impatient today; they do not like reading long items. Maybe you should write more about the president, for instance. Why not try the following: some time ago I was constantly criticized for my vocabulary: That it was I who did it, it was I who arranged it. Therefore, this is what I suggest you do: What has been important in Poland since 1980?

Certainly the August of 1980, then the Martial Law, then strikes, "the round table," and the withdrawal of troops. Check who did all that, who organized all that. Only then will we see how it all turned out and who is to blame for the entire situation.

[NOWA GAZETA] Mr. President, people are saying that you are paying us, that you have established this paper, that it is your paper. Therefore, we will take a look into that.

[Walesa] Let us leave it because people are saying various things. Let us talk about the most important moments that have determined the last 13 years. This will be more interesting. People will come up and put forward arguments that "this was not important; that was important." This is one matter. Another matter: You have mentioned the idea of an eastern NATO. Now, why do you not say that if the idea of 100 milljon zlotys had been implemented, today no one would say that privatization was bad. No one would say that there were no equal chances. Either you did it badly, or you did not get down to it. It is your business. Now, who was right again? I was ridiculed. This was the only solution. I knew that some people would try to outwit others. Therefore, we should have offered equal chances to everyone. There would be people who would not seize them, but it would be their business. If we follow this line of reasoning, we will say that the idea of an eastern European Economic Community [EEC] was good, the idea of an eastern NATO was good, and the withdrawal of Russian troops was good, as well as many other things. This includes what I have achieved with Yeltsin: an unequivocal statement that no one will stand in our way to NATO.

[NOWA GAZETA] Thank you very much for the time devoted to our paper and our readers.

PSL's Pawlak on Economy, State, Elections

WS1309080093 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 10 Sep 93 p 3

[Interview with Polish Peasant Party Chairman Waldemar Pawlak by Ewa Czaczkowska; place and date not given: "We Do Not Have To Have Complexes"—questions published in boldface; information appearing under last three subheads attributed to P.A. and E.Cz., published in boxes]

[Text] [Czaczkowska] How would you describe the current position of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] on the political scene—is it still a peasant, center-left party, or has it already become a leftist one, judging by political affiliations—I refer of course to the Union of Labor [UP]?

[Pawlak] In the past, the division between left and right was quite simple, but now it is a relative distinction in my opinion. When we talk about social or economic issues, we use concepts and values coined by the left wing, such as social justice, priority of labor over capital, providing equal opportunities for all people. But at the same time, these are values about which a lot is said in the church's social teachings. On the other hand, when we talk about respecting the past or retaining our cultural heritage, then we approach the right wing. That includes the issue of attitudes toward the church. PSL is exactly in the middle of those who think that religion can be pushed aside and those who want to use religion to solve all our problems.

[Czaczkowska] The main point of PSL's economic program, I think, can be described most simply as a regulated market economy. The program's critics say there is much more state protectionism in the program than there are market rules.

[Pawlak] I would give the critics this piece of advice: Go to the West and see how the economies of EC countries are managed, or in the United States, then you will be less dogmatic and more practical. We can notice the subtle differences that during an economic crisis, more state activity is needed, while during a period of prosperity, a liberal approach is needed. This is the way it happens in Western economies. During periods of development, there was a lot of talk about liberalizing commodity turnover, but when recession came, protective customs duties began to be introduced, as well as minimum prices for various products, and so forth and so on.

[Czaczkowska] What is PSL's prescription for reviving the economy?

[Pawlak] As far as immediate measures are concerned, we think the country has a lot of untapped organizational potential which does not require capital, just discipline and effective management. One cannot say seriously that state officials are not responsible for the economy at all. The economy of a country is one huge enterprise which has to be managed wisely. Even the government took notice of that now, before the elections, and it recognized that certain measures must be taken, such as reorganizing the customs system, synchronizing the tax system with the information system, and putting the tobacco and alcohol market in order. The implementation of these decisions leaves a lot to be desired, though.

Speaking about the long term, we are not clear on "what the name of the game is." At the point when the command-and-distribution type of economy was being abandoned, it could have been decided that introducing a new type of economy—the market economy—was a goal for its own sake. But that point in time is long gone now. While debating Poland's vital interests and what they are, we were suggesting that intellectual, cultural, and economic development of society should be regarded as the general goal. Our evaluation is that as far as education, science, and culture are concerned, we face a recession which is going to be even more severe than the one in the economy, and that is why we would have certainly arranged the ratios of budget expenses in a different way.

[Czaczkowska] You mean without increasing the budget?

[Pawlak] Every alternative is possible. If you want to retain the budget's level, you have to make harder choices. Just like in the previous period of the country's history, expenditure for the budget sector now amounts to 50 percent of the budget. We should also remember that during the last four years, expenditure for administration has been rising continuously, while expenditures for education, science, and health services have been declining. I appreciate the function performed by state clerks, but I must ask again: Is the issue here to have better clerks with higher salaries, or is it to just have more of them? For us, developing education and science is beyond debate because economic development can only be carried out by highly knowledgeable people.

One should also consider what direction our economy should take in its development, and then say it clearly. In our opinion, because of geographical factors, economic potential, and raw materials, that direction should be toward light industry, agricultural food processing, the machine industry, housing, and processing raw materials such as copper, sulfur, or coal. Because of high unemployment, we must give priority to developing those branches of industry which will create a high demand for labor. That is why we are surprised by the trend to sell our companies in the automobile industry. Those companies create enormous demand for services and semimanufactured goods.

[Czaczkowska] With obsolete technology, cheap labor will again result in products which will not be bought easily, unless we are forced once again to close our borders. That happened before.

[Pawlak] Do you not think that enough scrap metal has already come into Poland from Europe? Only when General Motors said it would not invest a penny in Poland unless a protective domestic market was introduced, only then was a 35-percent customs duty on automobiles introduced. One can see by this example that if conditions at the time had not been created for stripping this or that automobile factory, perhaps by now we would have better and far more modern domestic automobiles. Let us invest in improved technologies instead of "scrap metal."

[Czaczkowska] PSL has been consistently rejecting the program of popular privatization. What are you suggesting instead?

[Pawlak] We are suggesting a privatization program which will improve the effectiveness of management, one which would not deny but rather create opportunities for producers. Here is an example of our reasoning. If a farmer has good and bad land, or one field located close to or far from his house, which piece of land will he sell first? If he wants to continue cultivating the land, he will sell the bad land which is far away. Unless, for instance, he gives up farming and decides to open a factory. In that case, he will keep the piece of land located near the road, because it is the best from that standpoint. Under the current privatization program, we fail to notice this good-manager type of thinking. It is not a big deal to manage a well-organized company, but privatization skills should be used where management is poor, assets are underused, and the staff is disorganized.

[Czaczkowska] Will such companies be able to attract foreign capital, or do you want to use domestic capital exclusively?

[Pawlak] There is a simple difference between foreign capital and foreign companies. A solid Polish company which is well established in the market, I mean a state-owned company in partnership with the State Treasury, can borrow money anywhere: Warsaw, London, New York, and so on. It will have the money delivered in a briefcase, right to its doorstep. It is the company that makes the decision not to buy ready-made products, but modern machines and technologies. It is a different case if a foreign company enters the market, especially one whose business back home is in the same field. That company uses its own cooperating partners as a basis. What are the consequences of that? One could provide examples of confectionery plants which import powdered milk from abroad, or examples of food-processing plants which import carrot sticks on the pretext that the foreign carrots are orange whereas ours are red. This mechanism of transferring financial profit into foreign accounts is clear and understandable for all. Only the Polish liberals pretend they cannot see it.

We are sensitive neither to capital nor foreign companies, but to watching over one's own interests.

[Czaczkowska] All right, these are indeed certain suggestions, but as far as the program for the countryside is concerned, you are suggesting nothing other than maintaining the status quo over the coming years. Only when other sectors of the economy develop, will they allow farmers to create new jobs, and then ownership transfers will be possible.

[Pawlak] Not quite. It is our philosophy that people should be given some kind of opportunity. If the current unemployment rate in cities is 15 percent, how can anyone blame the countryside if it guarantees jobs, housing, and a feeling of security to potentially unemployed people? What could we offer the people in the countryside? Selling the land and going to the unemployment office? There is no positive alternative. If someone has three hectares of land, he is not going to sell it now because with the land he will feed himself and his family, without being a burden to the state. Should we take the land away from him and give him unemployment compensation instead? Where should we take the money for that unemployment benefit? This is stupid. We must look for a way in the countryside which would allow for its rebirth, for creating new, attractive jobs there, in food-processing, services, commerce, so that people have employment opportunities apart from cultivating land. As time goes by, and as they become more and more sure

of the stability of those jobs, they will most probably sell or lease their land. Scientific progress currently allows for creating extremely sophisticated economic ventures in areas far removed from city centers, and from this perspective we should create a network of roads and highways as well as telecommunications, to create development possibilities for those people, and then their overall situation will improve.

[Czaczkowska] What kind of a model of statehood does PSL propose for Poland?

[Pawlak] We are suggesting the model of republican democracy because only under this model can all citizens have an impact on ruling the country, and anyone with talents, skills, and knowledge has the right and the practical possibility of reaching different posts in the state's structure. We are not in favor of a model where wealth is in the hands of few and poverty is spreading more and more.

[Czaczkowska] But is it supposed to be a democracy with a strong parliament or a strong president?

[Pawlak] The two are not mutually exclusive. Authority should be implemented through a representational system, and if there are a number of big political parties in parliament—and this is where we are heading—then they create a strong parliament, while a coalition composed of these parties constitutes a strong, stable government, with significant social support. It cannot be an authority which is just "pinned up" to some cabinets or personal arrangements. Power is lost not by specific crises but by one's own weaknesses. If a government cannot solve problems which are important for society, then simply put, that government should just resign, regardless of the political system.

[Czaczkowska] Do you mean to say that is the reason for the rising popularity of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] and PSL?

[Pawlak] The reasons are different for each of the two cases you mentioned. People know that SLD basically supports current policies. SLD says it would implement the policies better than the current government. But people are willing to vote for SLD, to a large degree, out of sheer obstinacy, out of their disapproval for Solidarity polices which, I think in the common opinion, have failed. On the other hand, PSL is associated with the hope of changing economic and social policies, of getting Poland out of the dead-end street, or at least people tell us so during meetings. We had an opportunity to provide examples, also contemporarily, that one can act effectively and be a good manager in Poland.

[Czaczkowska] If you mean the 33 days, that period was too short. Now if you mean being in the opposition, which PSL has been doing, it is precisely about making promises.

[Pawlak] I do not think so. Being in the opposition is also about presenting alternatives.

[Czaczkowska] One can read in one of PSL's election leaflets that the party thinks it necessary to grant the government the right to issue decrees, which may be surprising for all those who remember that PSL had consistently sabotaged initiatives on this issue by several governments. Is this how being sure of victory manifests itself?

[Pawlak] We spoke very clearly about the government being given special authority, but not to implement decrees on issues as general as those which had been proposed. These should be very specific issues and the government which receives the authority should be backed by a strong majority in parliament. When Grabski received authority from parliament to conduct monetary reforms, it was clearly stated what particular issues that authority covered, what kind of figures should be achieved after the reforms were implemented, and also the length of time during which the reforms should take place. Full powers may only be given to implement such specific issues, and when the goal is accomplished, those powers should be withdrawn. Relying on parliament's decisions is perhaps a slower process, but it is a safer one as well.

[Czaczkowska] PSL is also against continuing administrative reforms in the country, against creating powiats [administrative districts] which also seems strange, if only because of your electorate, which resides primarily in villages and small towns.

[Pawlak] It is not strange, it is a practical approach. Does Poland have the financial means to conduct the proposed reorganization? Let me go back to the idea of selecting a list of priorities. What is more important, an improved situation in education or creating even more administrative structures? Was the self-government reform conducted to give authority to communes, and now to take it almost all away? We are not opposed to creating powiats, we are even less opposed to improving the administrative structure; what we are saying is it must be done wisely, the timing must be proper, when the economic situation improves. Maybe it should be done in a different way and with fewer up-front expenses?

[Czaczkowska] What do you think is the reason for the popularity of PSL and you, personally, as a politician?

[Pawlak] That is a question which is more for sociologists and journalists to answer than me. I think that PSL's popularity is, among other things, a consequence of our practical approach to life, to the world. We think there are enough educated people in Poland to not have complexes, to be able to act independently and not always follow someone.

Attempt at Social and Political Forecasts

If PSL wins the elections, we should expect the following in the area of a political regime, social issues, and foreign policy:

1. Transforming the Senate into a self-government chamber.

2. Speedy enactment of a new Constitution.

3. Renegotiating certain agreements regarding Poland's association with the EC.

4. Delaying Poland's membership in NATO (PSL is in favor of extending the CSCE to cover military structures).

5. Creating a Treasury and a Ministry of the Economy.

6. Abolishing the Ministry of Ownership Transformations and reorganizing the Ministry of Finance.

7. Maintaining the status quo in the country's administrative structures, halting powiaty reform.

8. Halting the process of transferring schools to regional self-governments until "the operation is appropriately prepared."

9. Enacting a new law on political parties which would create financial fundamentals for big political parties and make registering new parties difficult.

10. Introducing mandatory public service in the form of work orders issued to unemployed people.

11. Maintaining the current extent of social benefits.

12. Increasing expenditures on education, health services, science, and culture.

Possible political alliances:

In terms of an economic program, the party which is the closest to PSL is UP. Pawlak's party does not, however, rule out an alliance with any party, from SLD to the Christian-National Union. Possible alliances with the liberals or with other peasant parties, have few enthusiasts among PSL members.

Attempt at Economic Forecasts

Most probably, PSL will be one of the three strongest political parties in the new parliament. One could assume then, that if PSL participated in a government coalition, relatively many program items would be included in the government's program, especially those related to the countryside, agriculture, the agricultural and food industry, and customs duties.

We forecast that this would mean:

—a general decrease in the rate of privatization; a fundamental revision of the program of popular privatization is probable;

—an increase in the budget deficit and of inflation; one can assume that inflation will exceed 50 percent within a year (on a yearly basis); the degree by which it exceeds 50 percent will depend on how strongly the Polish National Bank opposes accelerated growth of the money supply;

—increases in food prices will exceed increases in other prices (subsidizing some basic food products is less probable);

—an increased transfer of personal income and budget and para-budget financial means from cities to the countryside, in different forms; one can predict, among other things, a clear increase in customs duties, subsidies, and other means of protecting the consumer market, especially the agricultural and food market, and introducing export subventions for certain agricultural products;

—an increase in the final tax rate for personal income to 50 percent (the proposed tax on consumption will not be introduced); a certain increase in tax burdens in the economy, which will be decreased, however, by a system of different tax benefits, subsidies, subventions, etc.;

—increased intervention by the state in the economy;

—pressure on preferential credits and benefits in payments for agriculture, for state farms, the food industry, agricultural machinery industry, the fertilizer industry, etc.;

—impediments to foreign investments in Poland, limitations on currency (capital) transfers from Poland, limits on foreign investment in Poland.

Among the Leading Parties

PSL leaders assure people that despite the fact that election poll results are favorable for the party, they accept them calmly and with certain reservations. For more than a year, PSL has gained more than 6 percent according to research conducted for RZECZPOSPOLITA by the Sopot-based Social Research Institute. In July of last year, there was a clear increase in social support when Waldemar Pawlak was called on by the Sejm to be prime minister and attempted to form a government. After his mission failed, there was a sudden decrease in PSL's popularity, which lasted until November of last year. Since that time, the number of people declaring their willingness to vote PSL has been on the rise again.

In the first months of the period being discussed, PSL was fighting with SLD for third place; since the beginning of this year, when SLD began the race with the Democratic Union, PSL's rival in the race for third place has been the Confederation for an Independent Poland.

In the last poll conducted by the Social Research Institute in August of this year, Pawlak's party also occupied third place, with 12 percent of the votes. According to research by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] and DEMOSKOP, also conducted in August, PSL is more popular. According to CBOS, PSL took first place

with 16 percent—which was a big surprise—while according to DEMOSKOP, it took second place with only 1 percentage point less.

BBWR's Olechowski on Forming Cabinet, Policies

LD1309194693 Warsaw PAP in English 1609 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 13—The Non-party Reform Bloc (BBWR) announced on Monday that Presidential Economic Adviser Andrzej Olechowski would be the bloc's only candidate for the post of prime minister of the future government.

Olechowski, 46, said that he would be ready to form a cabinet only after being sure that it would be a majority government and formed by the prime minister and not by coalition members. He wants a government which would able to pursue an economic policy in tune with a programme worked out by the Presidential Council for Economic Development.

Referring to priorities in Poland's foreign policy, Olechowski pointed to Poland's determination to join NATO and expand contacts with the European Communities, and pursue an active eastern policy.

BBWR representatives said that they "did not have any problems in wording a reply" to President Walesa's letter addressed to leading political parties last week, as answers to president's questions are included in the BBWR programme.

They recalled that they recognize the "300 million" programme as a formula for privatization enabling workforce to have greater share in ownership changes, while unemployment is a result of the hitherto processes of economic transformations.

Opinion Poll Examines Role of Politicians

AU1309192693 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 11-12 Sep 93 p 2

[Report by Tomasz Zukowski: "Does Being an MP Mean an Escape From Politics?"]

[Text] The elections will be upon us soon. The new parliament will meet in a few weeks' time. Listening to the main political parties leaders' speeches and hearing partly slogans on television or seeing them on posters, it is easy to forget that despite the great diversity of political programs, they all have something in common. They display the way of thinking of politicians, i.e. people who have more than a passive interest in public life.

But what do ordinary Poles, not connected with authority or the exercising of authority, think of the goals of parliament and future parliamentarians? It is not easy to discover because first, the average Pole has thus far not been at all willing to discuss politics (at least not before the elections), and second, the Warsaw residents we did speak to preferred to comment on what parliamentarians should not do, rather than what they should do. Our respondents all agreed that politics is a subject unworthy of real, good politicians. This outwardly surprising view is the result of the fact that for some time, "politics" has been identified by opinion poll respondents as a behind-the-scenes Machiavellian contest and endless discussions rather than resolving problems. To the average person, "politics" means seeking a good position for oneself and a struggle for power, rather than the practical reaching of decisions. Real life and Poland's problems are alien to politicians, said our respondents. According to them, politics takes place in a different world, as it were, and the country is ruled on the basis of one's private interests, disregarding Poland's interests. Therefore deputies should not indulge in politics.

A "proper" Sejm also cannot occupy itself with matters of purely symbolic significance or "secondary topics" (examples of which, in the opinion of our respondents, are the question of abortion or the introduction of religion to schools). The respondents also agreed that deputies must not compete for positions of privilege, "enter into schemes," and try to set themselves up for the future.

Only after we had listened to these views, often colored with emotion, could we ask what the parliament's chief tasks should be.

The Sejm should deal with the things on which our lives depend, said the respondents. They wanted to be secure in the knowledge that the Sejm is working on issues they consider of the greatest importance. The following issues were mentioned in this context: unemployment, problems with the health service, the growing educational barriers ("soon, poor people will not be able to afford education for their children"), and the collapse of the pension fund.

The creation of new legislation and control over the government were also mentioned among the tasks of parliament.

Thereby it transpired that people are finding it very difficult to abandon general expectations ("creating legislation," "representing interests") in favor of specific tasks. But when mentioning these specific tasks, people often restricted themselves to things insignificant in terms of Poland's future, such as the problem of homeless people sleeping in Warsaw's Central Station. The conclusion seems to be that the average Pole does not quite know what the role of the Sejm is and how the Sejm works.

In the opinion of the respondents, a deputy must be honest and credible in order to perform his tasks. In other words, morality is the chief criterion by which a deputy should be assessed, according to the poll. Respondents also expected deputies to represent the interests of the whole of society or of individual professional groups. What is interesting is that a deputy's links with political

parties was virtually overlooked altogether. A knowledge of party programs also did not figure prominently among the general knowledge of respondents.

Is it worth being a deputy? Respondents agreed that the life of a parliamentarian brings more advantages than disadvantages. The advantages, as mentioned by the respondents, include salaries and allowances, prestige, and immunity from prosecution. Interestingly enough, power itself and the opportunity to create law was not mentioned as a perk. On the contrary, most respondents considered this a major reason not to be a Sejm deputy. Other disadvantages of being a deputy are the great responsibility, loss of personal life, and considerable burdens. ("I prefer to have peace and quiet," said our respondents).

As we can see, the way the average person perceives politics is full of inconsistencies. it is obvious that when criticizing (often with justification) the people in power for their inability to learn the principles of democracy, we tend to forget that we too are not without blame.

Government Statement on Israeli-PLO Accord

AU1409065793 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Romania's government statement on the mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the PLO and the installation of Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho has been faxed to us.

Romania's government has taken note and greets with particular satisfaction the Israeli-Palestinian accord regarding Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and the City of Jericho signed in Washington on 13 September 1993.

This political move of great courage coupled with mutual and simultaneous recognition between the State of Israel and the PLO, is of profound historic significance not only for the Middle East, but for the entire world since it crowns, in a happy way, the long-standing and persevering efforts towards establishing peace in a region located near Romania and where the noise of weapons has often drowned the voice of reason.

The statement also emphasizes that the mutual recognition and installation of Palestinian self-rule constitute two events of elevated wisdom and strong political will on the part of the Israeli Government and the PLO leadership designed to bring about an historic reconciliation between Israel and Palestinian Arabs and to direct relations between them toward a new road of peaceful and mutually advantageous coexistence and cooperation.

The main merit in this move undoubtedly goes primarily to the political leaderships of both sides, but it is also true that this would not have been possible, without efforts by the international community and primarily by the U.S. Administration, as well as by numerous countries in the world, among which Romania was always in the forefront.

The noteworthy impetus given by the Madrid peace conference of 1991 and the direct Arab-Israeli peace talks in Washington on several occasions, with the active participation of the United States of America and the positive contribution by Russia, have finally led to these understandings, which, once again, consecrate international lawfulness as a vital requirement of world policy.

The statement points out that international community now faces the task of implementing the understandings, which have been reached. Trusting that the implementation of these understandings will permit the Israeli and Palestinian peoples to devote their efforts to reconstruction and development activities, Romania's Government declares its readiness to participate in the implementation of the economic programs in the zone enjoying autonomous status inhabited by Israelis and Palestinian Arabs.

On this occasion, too, Romania's Government expresses the conviction that Romania's traditional relations with the State of Israel and with the PLO will gain new scope to our mutual benefit and the benefit of international understanding, peace, and cooperation.

Iliescu Message Hails Accord

AU1409065693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1926 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 13/9/1993—On the occasion of the simultaneous and mutual recognition of the state of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and of the signing of the agreement on Palestinian autonomy in Gaza Strip and the City of Jericho, President Ion Iliescu sent messages to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzaq Rabin, PLO Executive President Yasir 'Arafat, and U.S. President William Jefferson Clinton, showing that the two actions represent an opportunity for joy and satisfaction and wishing them success in the efforts for the instatement of peace and prosperity for the Israeli and Palestinian peoples.

Melescanu Meets With Chinese Foreign Minister

AU1309193293 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 10 Sep 93 p 2

[Article by Alexandru Andon: "The Yellow Pole Seems To Be Magnetic"]

[Text] Although two rounds of talks were scheduled between the Romanian and the Chinese delegations led by foreign ministers Teodor Melescanu and Qian Qichen, the second round, which took place yesterday, 9 September, lasted twice as long as was initially scheduled. The talks focused on special aspects of joint interest insofar as the international situation is concerned.

The Chinese diplomat believes that "following the Cold War, the world is not yet stable but a multipolar one." Therefore, the countries in the Pacific basin, through their potential (including their economic potential) have an increasingly greater economic, political, and strategic role, thus, they can become one of the poles of power and influence. The head of Romanian diplomacy informed his Chinese counterpart about the situation in the Balkans and in the Yugoslav area and received in return information about the situation in the Southeast Asia.

Concerning the Bosnian conflict, the Chinese minister expressed the view that an armed conflict cannot be stopped by way of another armed conflict, that in this way the conflict could only be amplified. "Our view coincides with that of the Romanian side, problems should be solved peacefully and it is very important that one not resort to the use of force" said Mr. Qian Qichen.

This opinion is worth taking into consideration because China is a Security Council member with the right of veto. China's view of a multipolar world extends also to the distribution of poles of economic power. The Chinese diplomats expressed views on relations between economic blocs, such as the Economic European Community, NAFTA (North American Economic Bloc), and

the Southeast Asian bloc. It appears that, following this visit, Romania will strengthen its ties with the Southeast Asian bloc.

Melescanu, French Official Hold News Conference

AU1409065493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1802 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 13/9/1993—Romania's relations with France and the European Communities, problems of stability and security in Europe were the main issues Alain Lamassoure, minister-delegate for European affairs in the French Government, and Teodor Melescanu, Romanian foreign minister, tackled at a Monday, September 13 press conference.

"By everything it does, France is a supporter of the idea of unity in Europe and of the speeding up of the process of building a united and peaceful continent. In this respect, the French dignitary opined that those occupying key posts for the destiny of Europe should be attentive to prevent the re-appearance of sources of division, inequality and unbalance in Europe."

Referring to bilateral relations, the guest said that Romania's image and the transition to a market economy was an important topic in the talks he had with Romanian authorities. He opined that an agreement for the protection of Romanian-French investments might deblock and increase the volume of French investments in Romania.

For his part, the Romanian Minister of External Affairs Teodor Melescanu mentioned that Romania had asked France to make special efforts to back it to be admitted to the Council of Europe and have the association agreement to the European Communities ratified.

General Police Inspectorate Chief Examines Crime

AU1309115393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0908 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 13/9/1993—As many as 139,104 offenses were registered in Romania in the last eight months, by 35,930 more than in the same period of last year, told a recent news conference Major-General Ion Pitulescu, chief of the General Police Inspectorate of Romania. He also said the most spectacular rises were recorded with offenses against private and public property, topping by 30 per cent the figures of last year. He also noted the increase in the number of abuses, frauds, influence peddling and corruption, the cases investigated in this latter sector being 4,940, by 51 per cent more than in the first eight months of 1992.

The police chief opines that the most worrying factor was the dissemination of organized crime. Setting up a special squad of 90 officers, the Romanian Police has managed in three months a few sensational crackdowns on criminal gangs operating in Romania's territory, that were dealing in drug traffic, forged money, expensive car stealing, manpower traffic, etc. The squad managed to annihilate racket gangs that used to attack and rob foreign tourists, arresting over 450 offenders. Likewise, the police traced a network of Chinese criminals who came to Romania to start a crime syndicate on ethnic bases. Foreign labor traffic too, has been curbed: over 1,000 Indians, Sri Lankans, Somali and Nigerians brought to Romania without legal procedure were traced. Many of them were here in transit to Western Europe.

General Pitulescu said that the police had records prepared on cases of corruption at higher levels as well, but they could not be completed, both because of the excessive work they required and because of the absence of a specific legislation.

He added there were irrefutable proofs of the relations of former colonel, Corneliu Capatina, (who has recently filed complaints against a number of allegedly corrupt generals in the Ministry of the Interior of Romania) with traffickers of stolen cars, namely with Sava Dogmanov, one of the biggest international criminals, and Italian Valter Esposito.

PUNR-PDSR Dissension Reflects 'True Trend'

AU1309193193 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 3 Sep 93 p 8

[Interview with Petre Roman, president of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) by Cristina Dana Sofronie; place and date not given: "That Was Not a Simple Visceral Outburst"]

[Text] Since, lately, the attitude of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] has baffled all political parties, regardless of which side of the fence they might be, I asked Mr. Petre Roman of the Democratic Party (National Salvation Front) [PD(FSN)] for his opinion on this subject.

[Sofronie] How do you characterize the recent PUNR gestures and statements criticizing the ruling Social Democratic Party of Romania-PDSR?

[Roman] I do not believe that they are the reflection of a simple emotion or visceral outburst, which we have gotten used to, in a way. It seems that this is a reflection of a true political trend within the PUNR. I believe it is important and interesting to follow the way that this party's doctrine is going to crystallize. That is, whether it is going to be a national doctrine with a specific leaning in the sphere of economic and social policy, which I cannot define right now, but I hope it will be moderate, or whether the PUNR will confine itself to a nationalist-type of rejection diatribe, with extremist accents...

[Sofronie] Do you believe it likely, as certain people already seem to think, that some Cotroceni [presidential palace] scheming maneuver is behind these fulminating statements?

[Roman] No, I cannot believe in a diversion here. I would rather believe that the story with the bilingual signs had a diversionist purpose. I would not like to add fuel to further speculations, but we are never safe from the tentacles of misinformation and diversion, which were unfortunately practiced with so much success by the past regime. We are not safe from these habits and their revival, and there is also the likelihood that they might be even financed from certain quarters! It is true that such instances of diversion and misinformation, that is manipulations, can appear, but I do not think that this is the case now, in this PUNR affair.

Moldova To Receive 20 Billion Lei Loan, Fuel

AU1309193593 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 4 Sep 93 p 3

[Article by Mihai Roman: "20 Billion Lei for the Republic of Moldova"]

[Text] Finally, Romania has granted substantial economic assistance totaling 20 billion lei to the Republic of Moldova. The delegation of the Republic of Moldova, led by Minister of Economy Sergiu Certan, discussed and signed a protocol that, among other things, includes the following: A long-term state credit worth 20 billion lei granted by Romania for an eight-year period with a two-year grace period; the precise date on which the interministerial committees will agree on the method of delivery; and the volume of commodities, which will provided the Republic of Moldova, within the framework of the 6 billion lei in financial aid, which will be granted this year. Of the 6 billion lei, 2.5 will be nonrefundable (in the form of aid), while 3.5 billion lei represent big investments, culture, press, sports, and so forth. Both sides also agreed on the fuel quantity that will be delivered monthly by Romania until the end of the current year, namely 20,000 tons of fuel oil and 20,000 tons of gasoline. There are signs of economic closeness; let us see how they will be capitalized on.

Editorial Doubts Aid Usefulness

AU1309193693 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 3 Sep 93 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "A Useless Sacrifice"]

[Text] On the afternoon of 1 September, President Mircea Snegur met for almost three hours with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow. The same day, at just about the same time, Andrei Sangheli, prime minister of the Republic of Moldova, signed a number of trade agreements with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu in Bucharest. According to news agency reports, the presidents of Moldova and Russia pledged to further support the establishment of an economic community within the CIS.

Reporters accredited in Bucharest consider the agreements signed by the two prime ministers as part and parcel of the economic assistance granted by Romania to the Republic of Moldova, so that the latter can overcome the difficulties it had to face after the Parliament's rejection of adherence to the CIS. Following President Ion Iliescu's solemn appeal, Romania's government granted a credit to the Republic of Moldova over a period of eight years. On the basis of this credit, the Republic of Moldova will purchase 10,000 tonnes of gasoline, 20,000 tonnes of Diesel oil, and 5,000 tonnes of motor oil. Even though the official statements in Chisinau and Moscow do not openly state it, there is no doubt that President Mircea Snegur went to the Kremlin to promise that, in spite of the Chisinau parliament's vote, the Republic of Moldova will join the CIS. Asked about this by the BBC, Mr. Ion Butnaru, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Moldova, said that President Mircea Snegur's presence in Moscow, while Prime Minister Andrei Sangheli was visiting Bucharest to implement the accords on Romania's economic assistance was a simple coincidence. Is that really so? In my opinion, the answer is no. The Chisinau diplomat's statement is flagrantly contradicted by the prime minister himself.

Also asked about this by the BBC, Andrei Sangheli said something that is bound to be somewhat baffling to us here, the Romanians on this side of the Prut River. Not only has Romania granted a loan to the Republic of Moldova, but so has Russia. According to Andrei Sangheli, the credit amounts to some 50 billion rubles, which were practically used up by the Republic of Moldova to obtain gasoline, diesel oil, and part of the necessary raw materials for the republic's industry in the months of September and October. Moreover, the Chisinau prime minister added, slightly annoyed, that "in principle, Moldova is paying for all that it buys or takes from other places, and we are ready to immediately settle our accounts with Romania, too, since we do not want to take anything for nothing from no one."

What did he mean to imply by using such language? Nothing more or less than the fact that Andrei Sangheli considers it an affront to talk about aid given by Romania. Aside from the fact that the Republic of Moldova has received credits from both Moscow and Bucharest, our guest's statements give us reason for "much perplexity," to use the famous collocation of Gelu Voican-Voiculescu [former deputy prime minister in the immediate post-revolution period]. After the Chisinau parliament's rejection of the accord with the CIS, high ranking Romanian officials said that our brothers across the Prut River are faced with huge economic difficulties and that we, Romanians, must jump to their help. We should do this, they said, even though we are not faring all that much better and are short of gasoline and diesel oil ourselves, and we are on the threshold of winter.

Their reasoning was that by rejecting the accord with the CIS, our brothers across the Prut River have sacrificed themselves on the altar of the much desired union. Mircea Snegur's visit to Moscow and Andrei Sangheli's BBC statement cast a bizarre light on all the equally

solemn and emotional statements made by the executive power in Bucharest. According to Ion Iliescu and other political leaders, we sacrificed ourselves by giving to Chisinau from the little we have in order to support the Republic of Moldova in its desperate struggle to break with Russia. But Mircea Snegur's visit to and the credit received from Moscow makes us ponder the perception that our brothers across the Prut River do not contemplate parting with Russia and drawing closer to Romania.

Moreover, as one can see from Andrei Sangheli's statement, the Moldovan Government does not consider our outstretched hand to be help. In these circumstances, one has to ask oneself: What is the point of the economic assistance we are giving to Chisinau? Particularly since, in doing this, we deprive ourselves of much needed resources and will have to tighten our belts more. Unlike our brothers from the Republic of Moldova, we do not have a Moscow to give us credits of billions of rubles for our winter supplies of gasoline and Diesel oil.

Like all the Romanians, I also believe that the unification with those beyond the Prut River deserves all sacrifice, including the fact that we must be worse off, if only to help those in the Republic of Moldova break with Moscow. As can be seen from what I have said before, however, the current sacrifice will not contribute in anyway to fulfilling the great dream of the unification. Those in power in Chisinau are firmly determined to rejoin the Russian Empire. Therefore, I ask myself, like all Romanians: What is the point of our current sacrifice? Is it worth anything?

Editorial Views Current Fight for Power

AU1309165093 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 1-8 Sep p 32

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "Let Us Fight It Out Using Corruption as a Weapon"]

[Text] Ever since the corruption scandal broke out in the post-December Romania, everyone has been comparing the situation in our country to that in Italy. Such a comparison has been and still is unfavorable for Romania. None of the journalists discussing this issue have hesitated to emphasize the fact that, while in Italy they went so far as to arrest a number of political figures, in Romania they have not even managed to fully complete the inquiries conducted by a parliamentary panel.

In my opinion, comparing the situation in Romania to that in Italy is a method lacking efficiency. On the other hand, more efficiency could be achieved if one compared the situation in our country to that in Russia. If one really did that, one would discover amazing similarities. Both in Romania and Russia, everyone is talking about the perils of corruption. Both here and there, politicians have turned the fight against corruption into one of the main points of their propaganda campaigns. The mere problem is that, both in Moscow and in Bucharest, the fight against corruption is a quite obvious pretext used for political show-downs. Owing to the primitive character of democracy in Russia, this fact is much more visible there than in our country. The facts, however, are identical. This allows one to more easily discover the main traits of the process of turning corruption fighting into a political weapon in our country by simply analyzing the events currently going on in Russia.

As everyone can see, so far, the two opposite sides, currently dividing not merely the political class there but also Russia's population, are engaged in a bitter struggle for power. In order to achieve that goal, both sides are putting on a big show and voicing big phrases: democracy, market economy, reformism, conservatism, and, of course, Mother Russia. However, such big phrases conceal precise economic interests. The struggle between the two political groups actually expresses, on the political life plane, a muffled but desperate mafia-type battle for as large as possible slice of the cake called national wealth.

In Russia and Romania, as well as in all other former communist countries, we are currently witnessing a process that historians term the emergence of capitalism. Contrary to that classic process, the current one has good chances of maturing more rapidly. The reason for this is that a certain amount of wealth is already available for certain persons to become rich rapidly. Today's political battles, and not merely in Russia, but in all other Eastern countries as well, are actually being fought for the means that are necessary to become rich overnight. Everyone realizes that tomorrow's millionaires are being made today in all those countries. They are the ones, who tomorrow, owing to their economic power, will also hold the political power. It is quite obvious that the accumulation of capital by plundering the heritage left behind by communism is only possible if one is in power now. Whoever manages to be in office as a minister, counselor, or even a parliamentarian, now has good chances to become a powerful personality tomorrow. That is why the current battle for power is being fought so acutely, even hysterically. Mutual accusations and even juridical trials related to corruption are basic instruments used in that battle.

Who are the people fighting for power in order to be able to grab the means to allow them to become rich overnight? Doubtlessly, the members of the former nomenklatura. When referring to the situation in Russia, Romania, and other Eastern countries, many people suspect that nostalgic feelings for the old communist times are being prompted by the former nomenklatura. Nothing could be more false! If one carefully examines current reality in the former communist bloc, one will find that, everywhere, the former nomenklatura has been the most bitter enemy and the most efficient destroyer of the former regime and the promoter of democracy and the market economy. But why should that be so? Because the new regime is extremely convenient to the old nomenklatura.

The new system allows it to hold much more power compared to the one it held during the communist regime. This new power stems from the skillful maneuvering of democracy. Back in 1956, after Khrushchev's secret report revealing the crimes perpetrated by Stalin, many people wondered what the new masters of the Kremlin wanted to achieve by doing that. The answer is quite simple. The new masters were acting in the name of the nomenklatura. It was the same nomenklatura that had held power in Stalin's time as well, but in that era it had not been permitted to fully enjoy power. How could one fully enjoy power if a mere whim of Stalin could instantly land one in Siberia or, even worse, in front of the firing squad? How could one really enjoy power under the drastically ascetic living circumstances imposed by Stalinism? Power can be only really enjoyed if one is allowed to help oneself to its delights. What delights could the members of the Soviet nomenklatura possibly have, considering they were not even allowed to divorce?!

The new liberalism promoted by Nikita Sergeyevich [Khrushchev] opened the way for the nomenklatura to enjoy power to a much larger extent than previously in the Stalin era. The abolishment of terror made life more relaxing, not merely for the entire Russian population, but also for the nomenklatura. Malenkovism, and later on Khrushchevism, both launched the thesis highlighting the importance of each individual's private life. Everyone began talking and writing about the fact that socialism does not necessarily mean leading an ascetic life as well. Arguments were being sought in the work of classics of Marxism-Leninism to prove that socialism actually means the flourishing of human personality.

Certainly, at that time, the mentioned policy was also beneficial for the ordinary citizens of the entire communist bloc. However, those to profit most from it were the nomenklatura. After having eliminated the old ascetic norms, they could afford to really enjoy the delights of power. Their individual lives ceased to be censored by extremely severe moral regulations. They could afford to throw parties, to lead more relaxed individual lives, and to use their money openly, rather than secretly. Following 1989, that process has been and is repeating itself, although at a different proportion, in all former communist countries, including Romania. Regardless of how liberal socialism was made after Stalin, it still proved to be unable to offer the nomenklatura the same satisfaction capitalism has been offering to the bourgeois. The nomenklatura had power, but its power was ephemeral. In Romania, for instance, a great deal depended on Ceausescu's whims.

Additionally, owing to the quite severe norms imposed in our country by Ceausescu's code of socialist ethics and equity, the nomenklatura was barred from really enjoying power. A similar process, although at a much smaller scale, was also going on in all neighboring countries. After the abolishment of communism, the former nomenklatura discovered the enormous advantages offered by democracy and market economy. The new regime was offering it precisely the same things that had been forbidden by the old one: Durable power, because material wealth is tantamount to lasting power; the possibility to enjoy life without any limits, and to behave like stars. See how delighted are our current dignitaries, parliamentarians, and mayors to hold news conferences, let themselves be photographed, televised, or interviewed! They used to be dignitaries in Ceausescu's time as well. However, in those times, none of them would have taken the liberty to behave like a star. That kind of behavior was accepted in case of two main personalities, only: Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. All other persons holding power were compelled to keep out of the limelight.

Generally, even the public at large hardly knew the names of the ministers. Little was known even about the persons very close to Ceausescu. Comparing that situation with the current one, anyone can easily discover the significant advantages democracy and market economy can offer to the members of the former nomenklatura. In all Eastern countries, communism only used to offer them ephemeral power. After the fall of communism, the former nomenklatura found out that the new system is offering it a more ample and durable power than communism did. Not merely because, now, money has become more powerful than any office one may occupy, but also because, after having taken all institutions of the state of law under their control, those institutions can be turned into incomparably more efficient and powerful tools than the institutions and organizations of communism. Is it possible that anyone should protest the decisions taken by the Supreme Court of Justice? Can anyone afford to disobey its decision that they are not correct? The case of the train engineers proves that such a thing is impossible.

Protesters are immediately accused of having broken the rules of the game and having revolted against democracy. Thus, being aware of the advantages offered by holding power in a democratic system, the former nomenklatura is obviously engaged in a battle to obtain that power. Owing to the fact that the area of power is a limited one, we are currently witnessing a fight between the various factions of the former nomenklatura, a war fought in the name of noble principles. One of the most important weapons used in that war is the fight against corruption.

The polarization of the fight against corruption, as could be seen during the 30-31 August extraordinary parliament session, seems to be an unavoidable necessity. Both of the two conflict parties, equally here and in Russia, are using the fight against corruption to deal blows against each other. That is why they are accusing each other of being corrupt. The accusations correspond to the facts in the case of both. The reason for this is that the new bourgeoisie class cannot emerge in the absence of corruption.

In Russia, reformists and conservatives accuse each other of being corrupt. In Romania, the same accusations are voiced against each other by both those currently holding power and the opposition. Each party is trying hard to demonstrate that real corruption lies with the opposite party, whereas in ones own party there is nothing else but absolute correctness. Some of the journalists who examined the recent extraordinary session of Parliament thought that the fight against corruption was transferred to the political level because of opposing views, on which the anti-corruption panel's report, the one dated 30 June or the one dated 30 August, should be presented and discussed in Parliament. However, if one examines the facts more closely, one finds that the real reason for this should not be sought there, but rather in a different, less visible aspect.

Many people were surprised by Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Adrian Nastase's efforts to impose on the government coalition that only the 30 June preliminary report should be discussed. Some observers considered this a concession to the opposition, a signal beamed from the moderate wing within the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], saying that it is trying to avoid new tension in our political life. However, the real reason of Nastase's efforts should be sought elsewhere. Namely in a secret agreement, concluded before the extraordinary session by certain representatives of PDSR and the opposition, stipulating that the 30 August report should not be discussed. That agreement suited both the interests of the state power and those of the opposition. Adrian Paunescu [senator and vice president of the Socialist Party of Labor] has correctly read their intentions. That is why he insisted so much that both the [30 August] report elaborated by the [PDSR] majority in the anti-corruption panel and the one of its opposition members should be discussed in Parliament. Let us suppose, for instance, that the aforementioned agreement would not have been observed. What would have happened in that case?

Romul Vonica [PDSR senator and chairman of the anti-corruption panel] would have read the report elaborated by the members of the government coalition. That report contains embarrassing disclosures about the Airbus case [incriminating former premier Petre Roman]. Next, the representatives of the opposition would have read their report containing disclosures about the Petromin case and the Agricola case in Bacau. In the Airbus case, as well as in the other two cases, the tracks are heading high, very high, up to the leaders of the current state power and the opposition. Full disclosures on the Airbus case would have been fatal for the opposition. Disclosures on the other two cases mentioned would have had the same consequence for the state power. However, the disclosures made by Emilian Ijdelea, the [recently demoted] chairman of the Romanian Development Agency might spoil the whole plot.

HVO Denies Attacks on UNPROFOR Bases

LD1409121593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Members of the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] today came under fire in several places in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Five shells hit their base in Gornji Vakuf, while shells are also landing in the vicinity of a Spanish battalion base and in Jablanica. Croat Defense Council [HVO] formations have been blamed for these attacks. Since these are simultaneous attacks, a well-planned action with a precisely defined objective is probably at work there.

The main HVO headquarters has most vehemently rejected the possibility that HVO formations were responsible for the attack. Such a thing can be done only by those who seek a continuation of the war in which they may see a chance for themselves. The main headquarters believes the attacks were carried out by Muslim formations in order to have the cast blame on the HVO, which would make the Croat negotiating position in Geneva difficult.

The HVO wishes to continue negotiations and achieve a permanent peace in which the UNPROFOR will play a decisive role. This is the reason why the HVO wants better cooperation with them. In view of this, all attacks on the blue helmets are completely ruled out, a statement by the HVO main headquarters says.

European Branch of SDA Rejects Partitioning

AU1309203393 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Sept 93

[Text] The European branch of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] has written to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The letter was sent from Heidelberg in Germany, after a three-day meeting at which the problems of defense and rebuilding of Bosnia-Herzegovina was discussed. The letter states the following:

An infernal plan for the destruction of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its people—the Bosnian Muslims—is currently being implemented. Some members of our party are engaged in the same activity. At one point, these people have infiltrated our ranks. One of them—states the letter—Fikret Abdic, is a member of the country's Presidency. However, he is not an isolated case. There are more of them. They wish to sap our strength, our joint front for the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We need to defend our state and we are ready to do so. So far, we have only used a small part of our potential.

We must never allow the acceptance of genocide and war conquests. The most important thing is to persevere in the defense and rebuilding of our state, to secure the safe return of all refugees and exiled persons. This is the minimum below which no one can sign anything in the name of our people, states the letter of the European branch of the SDA to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Banja Luka Rebels Claim Proof of Illegal Dealings

LD1409090793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0822 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Banja Luka, 14 Sep (TANJUG)—Last night—the fourth night of the blockade in Banja Luka organized by the "September 93" group—passed quietly.

At about 0930 this morning, the crisis headquarters of the "September 93" operation put out a statement which says that "the conditions have been achieved for the situation to be resolved." It says that as a result of the information blockade, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, had not been appropriately informed about everything going on.

The statement stresses that a meeting between Karadzic and members of the crisis headquarters should be held today and that on this occasion the president will be handed voluminous documentary evidence of war-profiteering, crime, and illegal dealings.

Military hardware and personnel will continue to be deployed as at present on the streets "in case of possible provocations during the talks," the statement says. [passage omitted]

Maglaj Muslims Attacked From 'All Directions'

AU1309195293

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 13 September carries in its regular 28-minute newscast the following reports on the fighting in the Republic.

The first report comes from the Mostar Press Center. The unidentified correspondent says that "this morning, the Ustasha resumed their shelling of the city. As we report this, a savage attack by the Ustasha artillery is in progress. We still have no information about the number of killed and wounded in the afternoon's attack, but the number is bound to be great." She goes on to say that Mostar and the surrounding territories were exposed to the same kind of bestial attacks yesterday. "In the 4th Corps zone of responsibility the Ustasha forces used all available weapons to shell civilian targets. The fiercest attacks were registered in the South-Ilinden Operative Group. The demarcation lines remain unchanged. In the South 1 Operative Group zone of responsibility, a tank fired five to 10 shells at Malo Polje, Blagaj, and Koser. The shelling was supported throughout the day by antiaircraft machine guns, antiaircraft guns, and snipers.

"In the South 2 Operative Group zone of responsibility the enemy fired eight 82-mm mortars against Gnojnice and Dracevice. In the Center Operative Group the Ustasha forces used all artillery weapons. The narrow city center, comprised of purely civilian buildings, was

shelled. The city is pockmarked with craters over two meters deep." She adds that "a 122-mm howitzer fired 16 shells at the main street of the free part of Mostar. Around ten 120-mm mortar shells were fired at parts of the old city. The districts of Livac and Srednji Potoci were hit the hardest." The correspondent says that the defense lines have remained unchanged. Further on she adds that "the evacuation of our wounded continues today. Forty wounded should be evacuated to Zenica with a Bosnia-Herzegovina Army helicopter from Medjugorje. The UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] vehicles will take them there."

The studio announcer says that Brcko seems to have been mostly quiet today. However, correspondent Hamiz Deronjic says that "throughout the day, the Serbian aggressor is mostly provoking with small arms. Somewhat fiercer provocations have been registered on the central part of the front where the aggressor is using Broving, 60-mm and 82-mm mortars. The defenders are not responding."

Correspondent Ramiza Muharem says that "overnight, the zone of responsibility of the 208th Hill Brigade (?Celic) was exposed to fierce small arms' fire along the entire defense line. In addition to this, the enemy from Bukici used mortars to shell our positions, while he shelled the village of (?Celic) and the [name indistinct] from the direction of Bar and Perusic with a M-84 machine gun." She adds further on that "during the morning and later in the day the aggressor continued his small arms provocations along the entire defense lines."

Hajrudin Sermic reports from Maglaj and says that "shells are pounding us from all directions; from Teslic, Mt. Ozren, Brankovici, Jovici; over a thousand have landed on us so far. Constant attempts at infantry breakthroughs on the part of the Chetnik-Ustasha forces have been registered in the region on Lijesnica and Nekolj, but the heroes of the 201st Hill Brigade have repelled all the attacks. The town and the neighboring villages are being mercilessly destroyed. There are nine casualties in town so far, but this figure is not final. We are facing a difficult night, one of the most difficult in the three months siege of Maglaj."

Nijaz Banjanovic reports from Zvornik and says that "the Serbo-Chetnik army continues targeting residential areas with large caliber artillery. From their lairs in Klica and Jandrovici, Karadzic's animals used 120-mm mortars, a T-55 tank, and 120-mm howitzers to shell the region of Kraljevici, Svrake, and Sapna. Following this they fired some 50 howitzer shells at the village of Godus. Hundreds of shells from a T-84 tank landed on Zaseok and Nezuk. The enemy also fired several guided Maljutka missiles. All this took place in full view of UNPROFOR military observers. The shelling went on throughout the day."

The Gradacac Press Center correspondent reports that "from 1230 [1030 GMT] until 1400, the enemy from his strongholds in Skugrici and Turici used howitzers to shell the town and its surroundings. The town center was shelled with 150-mm projectiles. Using 150-mm howitzers, the enemy from Turici shelled the village of Mionica in the vicinity of Gradacac. While the town center is being destroyed, the Gradacac front lines are almost completely quiet. There are only some sporadic antiaircraft machine gun, antiaircraft gun, and small arms provocations."

Correspondent Amira Salihozdic reports from Olovo and says that "a fierce artillery attack from the enemy stronghold of Bevrice was launched by a tank and 82-mm and 120-mm mortars. The enemy from his stronghold in Arapovci shelled our defense lines and civilian targets in the region of (?Kolske) Ruke."

Enver Kadar reports on the situation in Vogosce and says that "fierce Chetnik artillery attacks against Suci and the Vogosce free territory continued unabated today. After a relatively quiet morning, a veritable inferno commenced, which reminded one of the July offensive carried out by the enemy against Sarajevo. From their strongholds in Butili, Zabrdje, Paljevo, Krivoglavci, Kremes, Blagovac, Tihovicko Brdo, and Poljine, the Chetniks pounded the area with all available means, using everything from 82-mm and 120-mm mortars to the heaviest howitzer shells. All our defense lines came under enemy fire, particularly those on Vis and peaks 850 and 830, Mujkica Brdo, the Traffic University, and Hotonje. Civilian areas were also shelled."

Attacks by 'Joint Aggressor'

AU1309144293

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1300 GMT on 13 September carries in its regular 26-minute newscast the following reports on the fighting in the Republic.

"After a quiet morning, at around 1200 [1000 GMT] the joint aggressor—Chetniks from Mt. Ozren and soldiers of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]—suddenly launched an attack against the positions of the 201st Hill Brigade of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the region of Nekolja," reports Maglaj correspondent Hajrudin Sermic. "They used all of their artillery, antiaircraft, and infantry weapons. There is fighting in progress at the time of this report. Our defenders are successfully resisting. In addition to the aggressors' attacks against the defenders' positions, they are also fiercely shelling civilian targets in the town and the suburbs. Tank, howitzer, and mortar shells of all calibers are ruthlessly destroying the town every minute. So far we have no information regarding possible casualties."

Fahrudin Bekic reports from Gorazde and says that "the Chetniks are again using helicopters on the Gorazde front, and they have not given up shelling civilian targets with artillery shells. The region of Renovica on the northern part of the front, and the region of Oglecevo on the southwestern part of the front were shelled with 82-mm mortars. The villages of (?Vasici) and Vukovici

came under tank fire directed from the stronghold of (?Pljevlja). The material damage is great."

Edhem Badzak reports from Konjic and says that "sporadic sniper fire directed at the town and the defense lines from HVO positions are the order of the day in Konjic." The correspondent goes on to say that "according to reports from the field, yesterday was similar." He says later that "moderate activity on the part of the Serbian aggressor's army has been noted in (?Smiljani) and the region (?Glavicina), and HVO extremists from the region of Zabrdje, Zasulje, and Tulag carried out provocations along the defense lines and the town. The valley of the Neretvica River was quiet with the exception of sporadic small arms provocations from enemy positions in the Prozor Municipality. The defenders did not respond."

Muslims Attacked by Serbs, Croats

LD1309211093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Excerpts] There was no peace today on the Mostar, Maglaj, Brcko, and Gornji Vakuf battlefields. Civilians have been killed again. More details in a report prepared by correspondent Irfan Calo. [passage omitted]

[Calo] The free territories of Gorazde came under chetnik attacks again today. Three people were killed and three were wounded. The Gornji Vakuf defense line was attacked with all weapons and artillery pieces available to the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Croatian Army. More than 1,000 shells hit the area.

Four people were killed and 20 were wounded in the latest attacks by the HVO and the Croatian Army on Mostar. The town itself, as well as the surrounding villages which are under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, came under attack. Forty wounded have been evacuated from the Mostar war hospital. [passage omitted]

Muslims 'Massacre' Croats Near Mostar

LD1309174593 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Excerpts] There is no fighting on the city front in Mostar, but confrontations are taking place around the village of Stanojevici, south of Mostar, where the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units have surrounded a Muslim sabotage group which penetrated the HVO defense lines last night and committed a massacre.

Last night this sabotage group ambushed, killed, and then massacred six HVO soldiers and wounded two. The soldiers were driving on the road near the village of Stanojevici, carrying food and medicine to their positions. UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] and EC military observers arrived at the scene of the massacre this morning, a statement by the HVO Defense Department says. [passage omitted]

The Muslim army action announces an offensive in which it wants to achieve by force the Muslim politicians' objective of gaining access to the sea, the statement by the HVO Defense Department says. It goes on to say that the Muslim army has brought three additional corps, and special units from Zenica to the Neretva valley, to join the Konjic and Mostar corps. [passage omitted]

Muslim, Croat Prisoner Exchange; Attacks Continue

LD1309200593 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Attacks by Muslim forces in central Bosnia have not ceased. [passage omitted]

[Reporter Marija Topic] An exchange of imprisoned civilians and soldiers who were held in Kacuni started in the village of Lug in the Kiseljak municipality today. A group of 280 Croats will be exchanged for the same number of Muslims.

[Reporter Smiljko Sagolj] Shortly before this news bulletin, we received a report from Busovaca saying that Muslim forces fired several shells at Busovaca from the direction of Kacun. Several people were wounded and one woman was killed. [passage omitted]

Bosnian Serbs Report Croat, Muslim Attacks

LD1309111493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1102 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Brcko, September 13 (TANJUG)—Croat forces launched a mortar and infantry attack in the night between Sunday amd Monday on the Bosnian Serb positions in the area of the village of Brvnik on the northeastern Bosnian war front from positions near Orasje, says a Bosnian Serb military source.

Fire of lesser intensity was also opened on the southern part of the Brcko battlefield from infantry weapons. There were no wounded among the members of the Bosnian Serb army forces, says the same source.

Committed to respecting of the latest ceasefire, the Serb side did not respond to the attacks.

The front in the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina was quiet this morning, but the Moslem forces from the area of Srebrenica violated the ceasefire during the night, says the source.

The Moslems opened small arms fire on several occasions towards the Serb village of Kravica, located about 10 kilometers west of Bratunac.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has been torn by a civil war of the local Moslems, Serbs and Croats for the last 18 months, caused by a violent secession of that republic from the former six-member Yugoslav Federation.

Croat Blockade of Konjic Not Affecting Aid Convoys

AU1009190493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units yesterday erected a wall 1 km away from the entrance to Konjic and positioned a heavy truck in front of the wall to prevent passage to humanitarian convoys for central Bosnia, the Sarajevo Command of UNPROFOR for Bosnia-Herzegovina reported at today's news conference.

The blocking of this communication route, however, does not threaten UNPROFOR's Lifeline operation of providing winter supplies for over 2 million of Bosnia-Herzegovina residents, since an alternative route has already been found, according to the press spokesman of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last Three Mosques in Banja Luka Destroyed

AU0909161393 Paris AFP in English 1609 GMT 9 Sep 93

[Excerpts] Belgrade, Sept 9 (AFP)—Fighting flared across central and southern Bosnia Thursday, with Bosnian Croat forces launching a massive artillery bombardment on the beleaguered Moslem sector of Mostar, local media reports said. [passage omitted]

UN officials in Sarajevo said a UN convoy managed to reach Jablanica Wednesday with 75 tonnes of food and was due to leave the town Thursday.

An UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo, William Aikman, meanwhile reported that Croat troops had seized the Bila heights overlooking the central Bosnian town of Vitez on Wednesday. [passage omitted]

In another development a senior official with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Larry Hollingworth, told AFP that arsonists had destroyed overnight the last three mosques in the Serb-held Bosnian town of Banja Luka, 170 kilometres (105 miles) northwest of Sarajevo.

Hollingworth condemned the attack as a "barbarian act." [passage omitted]

Health Care Institute Gives Casualty Figures

LD1109165893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] The republican health care institute has reported that 65 civilians were killed and 295 wounded in the last week of August, of which 12 were killed and 75 wounded in Sarajevo alone. As for the figures for the whole of August, 280 soldiers were killed and 1,262 persons wounded.

Granic Announces Acceptance of 'UN-Brokered' Cease-Fire

AU1409113293 Paris AFP in English 1120 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 14 (AFP)—Croatia accepted Tuesday [14 September] a UN-brokered cease-fire deal with rebel Croat Serbs, Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said.

The cease-fire, crafted by General Jean Cot, the UN Protection Force commander for ex-Yugoslavia, was due to come into effect at midday (1000 GMT) but it was unclear whether ethnic Serb forces had accepted the offer.

RSK Leader Rejects Offer

LD1309174093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, 13 Sep (TANJUG)—In connection with Croatia's latest aggression against the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], which has been going on for five days now, Djordje Bjegovic, prime minister of Krajina, has sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali.

"We are astonished at the fact that the United Nations, of which Croatia is a member, is doing virtually nothing to prevent the escalation of the war in this area and that it is supporting the escalation by its silence," the letter stresses.

We cannot accept the cease-fire being offered to us by Croatian General Franjo Tudjman, Bjegovic goes on to say. In his assessment this is yet another farce, because, although the order was given for a unilateral cease-fire, Croatian forces are continuing their brutal aggression against Krajina.

Stressing that the RSK is sincerely for peace, Bjegovic says that Croatia "is not a serious negotiator," and that as a result "we do not accept any Croatian cease-fire offer." In this connection, the letter adds: "We can only have talks with UN representatives on condition that they guarantee and decide in advance that sanctions will be imposed against Croatia, because it has unilaterally caused the war." Krajina is ready to accept an immediate cease-fire, but only when the Croatian Army begins to withdraw from occupied territory, Bjegovic's letter says.

Fierce Fighting Along North Dalmation Front

LD1409110693 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1017 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Excerpt] Knin, 14 Sep (TANJUG)—Fierce fighting has been raging all along the north Dalmatian frontline since last night, the army of Serb Krajina headquarters announced today.

The statement says that the Croatian side sought a cease-fire at 1930 last night but immediately afterwards bombarded Serb settlements in the Skradin hinterland with all available artillery, weapons systems, and destructive shells. Over 100 shells fell on this area.

At the same time, Croatian forces directed their fire on the Novigrad and Benkovac-Zadar sectors of the front. The settlements of Krusevo and Biljane Gornje in the Novigrad area and the villages of (Ceranje) and Miranje in the Benkovac area came under fire.

In the area of the village of Miranje, Croatian forces did not even spare a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] base, the statement says. "While conducting fierce attacks on the positions of units of the Serb army and not sparing civilian facilities and settlements, Croatia is bringing up fresh reinforcements to the Dalmatian side of Mt. Velebit." According to the statement, there were no casualities in last night's actions and material damage could not be estimated. [passage omitted]

Serbs Say Attacks Continue on Lika Front

LD1309142793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1248 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Knin, 13 Sep (TANJUG)—Although Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has ordered a cease-fire, his "formations" are still launching fierce attacks on the Lika front, the headquarters of the Serb Krajina army announced.

The statement stresses that, apart from unceasing combat operations, Croatian forces are still regrouping and bringing up new reinforcements and fresh units.

It has been learned unofficially but from reliable sources that a number of civilians and Serb fighters are still in Divoselo where they are fighting, although they are surrounded.

China's Qian Qichen Arrives for Visit

LD1409115793 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Sep 93

[Text] Qian Qichen, Chinese vice premier and minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Zagreb this morning for a several-day visit to the Republic of Croatia. The high-ranking Chinese guest was welcomed at the Zagreb Intercontinental Hotel by his host Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. Talks at the Croatian Foreign Ministry are to start this afternoon. Qian Qichen will also meet Josip Manolic, chairman of the Croatian Assembly Chamber of Counties.

Commentary on Izetbegovic's Territorial Demands

AU1309181593 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 3 Sep 93 p 2

[Commentary by Visnja Staresina: "A Trap for the Croats?"]

[Text] Negotiations have failed. Is the proposed peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina also definitively dead? Does that mean a new war, as many predict? And is the 4 percent of the controversial territory worth another 200,000 dead, as it is feared? Or, perhaps, they will nevertheless find some solution, before the very edge of the abyss. But will the fear of consequences of a new war help reach a compromise on peace?

After negotiations failed, no one even attempted to hide their depression and disappointment—neither the negotiators, nor the observers—especially since, in the afternoon, there were indications that an agreement was close at hand, that the Serbs had granted some concessions to the Muslims in eastern Bosnia, that they had also found a compromise solution for the access of the Muslim republic to the sea. It was expected that Izetbegovic would make a step toward the compromise by giving up some of his demands. Though it was obvious that the negotiations were difficult, their interruption was still a shock to many. However, after the first moments of depression, there are some optimistic indications again, although it is questionable whether they are just a desire or a feasible chain of events.

One thing is to try to explain Karadzic's unusual exit from the Hall of Nations; He was practically pushed into the car by his bodyguards and thus prevented from getting on the stand. Observers say that Milosevic was furious at Karadzic for rejecting territorial concessions, claiming that he was prepared to give the Muslims the 4 percent of the territory demanded and that, that time, he was really eager to obtain peace, because he had been promised that the sanctions would be lifted, which was his political priority at the moment. And later that evening, after negotiations were interrupted, Izetbegovic and Karadzic met again, and although Karadzic claims that more territorial concessions to the Muslims are not possible, but only exchanges of territories, it is estimated that he might grant some more concessions.

However, that could give the whole story a new dimension, and such an outcome could become a trap for the Croats and Croatia. Although Karadzic was asked to give more territorial concessions than Boban on the areas that were ethnically cleansed by the Serbs, the major bone of contention is Izetbegovic's main interest—Neum. Izetbegovic wants access to the sea at all costs, and it seems that he was encouraged from abroad (at least verbally), particularly by the United States. Regardless of the fact that the municipality of Neum is almost entirely populated by the Croats and regardless of its strategic importance for Croatia. Or perhaps precisely because of that. It is therefore not quite impossible that slow concessions in eastern Bosnia and the staged game of Karadzic and Izetbegovic, in which the Muslims, on one side, gain time for the offensive in central Bosnia, putting the Croats under a strong military pressure, and, on the other side, the Muslims are trying to initiate a political pressure on Croatia, which is being constantly blackmailed anyway, both by sanctions and by solving the problem of the integrity of its own territory. Distinct from the Serbs and Serbia, who can now give generous concessions of parts of the territory they have conquered, playing the role of a peace maker, the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina would, if that should happen, be brought to the position where they would be blamed for defending their own territory, and Croatia would be asked to give concessions on its own territory, and if it resisted, it would be accused of being against peace.

Therefore, Karadzic's concessions are not too big for the political interest of Croatia, regardless of how much they are justified regarding justice and morals. And no matter how absurd it may sound, right now it would be much better for Croatia, if Mladic and his military leadership continued to prevent Karadzic from giving further concessions. For that would be the signal for Izetbegovic to stop making demands.

Alija Izetbegovic is certainly the key person who, in this moment, can disentangle or further complicate the Bosnia-Herzegovina military and political knot. Further insistence on concessions that he claims are minimal and rejecting agreement leads to an even deeper political crisis, it does not only bring about the continuation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also threatens to initiate new wars. Izetbegovic definitely cannot get anything more in this war than what was offered to him, only less. But he can, instead, try to take Croatia to that abyss with him. Knowing his political disorientation and constant lagging behind crucial decisions, he might do that as well. And he might in the end say: "I did not mean to do that, let us go five months back!"

Federal

Simic Comments on Croatian Attack at Krajina

AU1309210593 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Today, Zeljko Simic, Yugoslav deputy prime minister, was a guest on the Belgrade Radio "An Argument More" program. This is how Simic commented on the latest Croatian aggression against the Republic of Serbian Krajina:

[Begin Simic recording] From this act, one can draw several conclusions, and they are all very disturbing. The first is that this act by the Croatian military forces has occurred at the moment when new preparations to resume the Geneva talks are being made and when support for the resumption of the Geneva negotiations are coming from everywhere, even the sides not inclined towards us, because everybody sees these negotiations as the only way to come to a real, just, and rational outcome of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Therefore, this attack on the Serbian Krajina has come at an extremely unsuitable moment. When I say this, I mean the international situation, not only that of our internal scene, the territories of the former Yugoslavia. However, for good analysts, people capable of seeing further ahead than today, this is not so unexpected, as Croatian leader Tudjman and his leadership have serious internal problems and such a fierce attack on the Serbian Krajina was one of the ways for him to conceal his internal problems, which are far from harmless. In fact, I think that they are extremely harmful to the destiny of his political leadership and, to put it that way, even for his totalitarian policy. [end recording]

Wheat Harvest Up 47 Percent From 1992

LD1309165293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1319 GMT 13 Sep 93

[Text] Belgrade, 13 Sep (TANJUG)—According to initial data from the Federal Statistics Institute on this year's production of wheat, 3.1 million metric tons of wheat have been harvested from 895,000 hectares, which is 47 percent more than last year.

This year wheat was sown on 218,000 hectares more land than last year, and the wheat yield per hectare was about 340 kg.

French Weekly Examines Blockade-Running on Danube

93ES0950A Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 20 Aug 93 pp 58-59

[Article by Vincent Nouzille, special correspondent in Romania: "The Busy Serbs Along the Danube Are Laughing at the Blockade"]

[Text] *At Calafat, a Romanian town on the border with Serbia, the long river is under a very strict embargo embargo from the forces of the UN. An economic war, where the optimism displayed by the authorities is immediately contradicted by the traffic of every sort to which the border areas lend themselves.*

The Giurgiu 31 had not stopped its engines. Having departed from the Romanian wharf at Turnu-Severin across from the Serbian shore 50 kilometers upstream, this powerful vessel pushing barges down the river continued its lazy descent of the Danube past the shabby harbormaster's office at the Romanian port of Calafat. That day, it was taking four empty barges downstream. Two military-patrol boats flying the flag of the Italian Border Guards left the Romanian shore lined with rusted frames and abandoned cranes to tie up next to the vessel. The Italian guards and three French policemen boarded the vessel, together with an officer from Calafat and Carole Ory, a young French Customs inspector. Their task was to confirm with the Romanian authorities that the Giurgiu 31 was not violating the total embargo imposed upon Serbia and Montenegro, which was strengthened in April of 1993 by United Nations Security Council Resolution 820. Without special authorization from the UN, no vessel can any longer navigate this stretch of the Danube, which enters Serbia beyond the Hungarian port of Mohacs and then proceeds along the boundary between Romania and Bulgaria to the Black Sea. The Giurgiu 31 had no such authorization. "I am a Romanian. I only carry Romanian freight," the captain insisted, in the hope that he would be allowed to proceed. It was not possible to stop the barges. "Domestic coastal shipping is not subject to the embargo," Carole Ory explained as she returned to the shore. The next convoy—six Ukrainian barges carrying iron ore, the cargo sealed by the Hungarian Customs officials in Mohacs—was not expected in Calafat for two more days. Carole Ory, walkie-talkie in hand, returned to the dusty office provided by the Vama, the Romanian customs service. She sent her report to Bucharest and returned to her surveillance, which is sometimes full of surprises. The other day, she had been required, at 0500 hours, to inspect a cruise vessel carrying American retirees who had come to admire the Serbian landscape!

Thorough Inspections

Carole Ory, together with two Turkish Customs officers, an American, and three French colleagues, has, since the beginning of July, formed the Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM) team in Calafat with the task of inspecting vessels bound downstream. Another team in the Bulgarian port of Vidin across the river is responsible for the vessels bound upstream. Like their colleagues in Turnu-Severin and Galati, these customs officers scrutinize trade documents, probe tanks and holds, and verify the registration numbers of the barges. "Obviously, it is not possible to examine every item of merchandise or to look into all of the sealed bins," Thierry Machet, one of the

French Customs officers, who volunteered for a three-month mission, admits. "When convoys carrying smuggled weapons or small equipment pass through Serbia, this is possible. But the transporters have no desire to create trouble for themselves with the international authorities."

At the request of the countries adjacent to Serbia, the European Community and the Conference on Collective Security in Europe (CSCE) approved this SAM apparatus, which is now being strengthened, in September of 1992. Within a few days, there will be a total of 185 customs officers, 15 of whom will be French. "It is not a question of replacing the authorities in these host countries," a Western diplomat serving with the CSCE in Vienna explains. "Rather, it is a question of providing them with technical assistance in enforcing the embargo."

In theory, the blockade is as strict as that imposed on Iraq during the Gulf War, and it is beginning to produce effects in Serbia that may well be difficult to bear as winter comes on. Production dropped off 42 percent during the first half of the year. As a result of the lack of raw materials and intermediate products, a number of factories have almost halted production. Gasoline is rationed. Unemployment is affecting 2 million Serbs, half of the active population. And the dollar today is worth 1.1 million dinars, as compared with 115,000 dinars six months ago.

Improvised Headquarters

Since several barges loaded with oil forced their way past the Romanian Customs authorities in January after threatening to dump their cargo, the Danube has been the focus of special surveillance. The natural artery for the transportation of materials—oil, iron, coal, phosphates, grains, etc.—to the countries of Central Europe, the river normally sees between eight and 10 convoys with a capacity of between 4,000 and 10,000 tons each pass by each day. The war in the former Yugoslavia has already reduced the traffic to four or five convoys per day, affecting the economies of all of the countries along the river. The strengthening of the embargo in these recent weeks has almost ruined navigation on the Danube. A Russian vessel detained in Calafat because it did not have the proper papers had to wait two and a half months for a green light from the UN! "Overall, it can be said that our SAM system is effective and serves as a deterrent." This is the opinion of Michael Smith, the American who supervises the SAM teams in Romania from his improvised headquarters in the basement of the American Embassy in Bucharest.

The mechanism seems even more impressive since Western European Union (WEU) military forces were deployed all along the Danube, together with the SAM customs inspectors, in the middle of June. The WEU officers who have staffed their operations center with 120 soldiers, including 20 French policemen, on two old cruisers tied up at the quay in Calafat, admit that "this is quite a crowd for very little traffic. However, any relaxation of our controls would lead to the immediate reappearance of many barges." It is said that the Serbs are prepared to pay their suppliers ever higher prices. Unable to obtain supplies via the river, for the time being, they are turning to the roads.

This tactic can be observed in Calafat. There are fewer barges on the Danube, but there are more vehicles waiting at the landing stage to cross the river. This is the new logic of the flow across this border. In this Romanian port in which 20,000 souls live, thousands of vehicles and trucks wait in line for several days to get across the Danube. This has been the obligatory crossing point on the route from the Balkans since it became impossible to drive across from the former Yugoslavia. Calafat has only a modest antique ferry for handling this traffic, which has increased vastly with the embargo. It would serve no purpose for the customs officials to speed up their inspection, since the ferry can only make 10 trips over and back each day!

The lines of vehicles stretch back through the filthy, winding streets beyond the edge of the village. "They can sometimes extend up to 10 kilometers," Nicolas, a young Romanian who is 18, comments. Seated on an oil drum beside a fresh-water basin, he sells bottles of Coca-Cola and Pepsi to the hoards of Turkish laborers, Czech tourists, and East European truck drivers waiting patiently under the merciless sun to cross the river. It is hard not to notice, among these waiting vehicles, the trucks registered in the former Yugoslavia carrying tanks bearing the names of companies that are often Austrian. Are they bound for Bulgaria in the hope of crossing the border between Serbia and Bulgaria, some 30 kilometers away, more easily? Probably. But no one is inspecting these vehicles. "This would make the waiting period even longer," an official in the harbor master's office who is sitting at a table in the restaurant on the corner, protests seriously. The SAM customs officers offered the Romanian authorities their assistance. They were politely told not to concern themselves with the highway traffic. Now they content themselves with counting the trucks that pass.

Running With No Lights

In reality, Bucharest, which has always felt close to Belgrade, has accepted with bad grace an embargo that it says caused it to lose $7 billion last year. "The Romanians want very much to demonstrate support for the river embargo if that will help them obtain financial aid in compensation. On the other hand, they show little zeal where the roads are concerned," a Western diplomat in Bucharest comments ironically. An official serving with the SAM authorities in Brussels plays down this rerouting of the traffic. "Busy traffic is to be seen around Serbia, but it does not involve any major volume. Our only real weak point is the Macedonian border." This is a very optimistic analysis.

On 20 June, nine trucks loaded with equipment for the oil industry forced their way across the border at the Hungarian town of Szeged. In the Timisoara region in Romania, where the Serbs routinely come to trade, trucks need only to keep to the secondary roads to cross into Serbia. Evasion of the embargo through Bulgaria and Bosnia is said to be a routine practice. It is endemic around Lake Shkodra in Albania, and massive along the Serbo-Macedonian border, where hundreds of trucks and trains coming from Greece proceed with no lights under the very eyes of impotent Western customs officials. Macedonia, which was extremely dependent on Serbia in the past, is asking for aid to survive the embargo. Despite the notable efficiency of the maritime and river blockade, Serbia is still a far cry from being shut off from the world.

Serbia

Seselj, Kostunica Deny Speculations About Coalition

AU1309153293 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Sep 93 p 8

[Report by R. Pavlovic: "Seselj and Kostunica Deny the News on Coalition"]

[Text] The most refreshing moment of this summer's political lull came about when a very daring assertion and forecast that the two Vojislavs had formed a secret coalition began to circulate.

Reportedly, Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], and Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], have formed a coalition. Some observers even reckon that a new duet of leaders is about to emerge, claiming that Seselj's and Kostunica's apartments are in the same neighborhood and that some joint actions have already been taken. As an example of such joint actions they take the contribution of the SRS and the DSS in crushing the political coalition of the Democratic Movement of Serbia [DEPOS].

The leaders of the SRS and the DSS discussed for POLITIKA what, of the above, is true, and the possibility of a coalition between former political rivals.

"There is no coalition," Seselj maintains categorically, adding: "Without any advance arrangements, it happened that certain political attitudes of ours simply coincided. I applaud their attitude to the Vance-Owen plan, that they have pushed into the second rank some of their people who hold anti-Serbian views. I do not want to name those people, in order to avoid additional reactions, but who they are is known," Seselj says.

He admits that nothing is accidental in politics, and explains that the coincidence of certain views held by the SRS and the DSS is a matter of political interests. Although denying the existence of any coalition, Seselj does not exclude the possibility of contacts between the two parties. For, he says, the DSS will soon grow stronger, and become a serious party of the political center and that the people from the Serbian Renewal Movement will begin to join it. He also anticipates shifts in the Democratic Party, claiming "it will get rid of Dragoljub Micunovic, and reunite with the DSS."

To our question of how he views the recently launched theory on the DSS and the SRS becoming closer, Kostunica answers:

"The differences between the DSS and the SRS are great, and more than obvious. The two parties differ from each other in a range of important questions: Their attitudes toward the regime, and their stances on the opposition attitude toward the ruling party, as well as social and economic measures that should be changed. We consider the Socialist Party of Serbia to be most responsible for the situation in the country, and for that reason we shall give the vote of no confidence to the regime, regardless of who starts it [as published]," Kostunica explains.

The leader of the DSS points to huge differences between the two parties regarding the principles of their platforms. As an illustration, he takes the example of when one radical took the floor in the Serbian Assembly and said something like: "The SRS cannot accept democracy. Democracy is full of hot air, and we do not need it."

"That is undoubtedly the attitude of the entire SRS. We in the DSS believe, however, that Serbia needs democracy," Kostunica explains.

At the end, the leader of the DSS made a comment on speculations about a secret Kostunica-Seselj axis and a coalition between the DSS and the SRS: "Any attempt to bring them closer together is in the domain of science fiction."

New Opposition Movement With Karadzic Foreseen

AU1409064793 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Sep 93 p 9

[Commentary by Cvijetin Milivojevic: "The Joker up the National Sleeve"]

[Text] The political scene in Serbia now seems to be devoted to a mass plebiscite for or against Radovan Karadzic [leader of the Bosnian Serbs], or rather the results of his policies, with the certainty that the number of those who are jumping on the bandwagon "alongside" the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs will be disproportionately greater than all those who joined it at the first stop. The ruling party and part of the self-styled "patriotic forces" are relying on the imminent success (perhaps in the form of early elections?) of their already promoted ideas "for the Serbian matter in Bosnia." The so-called "democratic opposition," with the Serbian signifier in its own name, is suddenly singling out Karadzic from the group of "Milosevic's bolsheviks and satellites." If one

can judge from a statement made by Dragan Veselinov in June, even that part of the civil opposition whom the "patriots" have christened with the adjective "treacherous" thinks that the "new state of affairs in Bosnia cannot be ignored...."

Not so long ago the Socialists hoped that the "merging" of Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] into the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] would be the logical consequence of previous "credits," but even at the first stage they met with reservations. The project of "SPS networks in all Serbian lands" has been put aside for "a more appropriate time." The Radicals have, again, chosen the tested tactic of being "the wind behind" Karadzic (like Milosevic once) and opened up a political front only with his party, hoping that most of the sympathizers of the numbed SDS would anyway put on the "radical colors."

From the beginning Dragoljub Micunovic has been the most consistent—never totally but always alongside the man from Niksic [Karadzic] now in Pale—although the Democrats seem to have overestimated when they supported the "three-way ultimatum" to the Jahorina parliament in April. Vojislav Kostunica jumped into the empty space, and we have learned unofficially that the old idea of a unified SDS in all Serbian lands could be concretized if the manifestos, as well as the organization of Radovan Karadzic's party, the Democratic Party of Serbia, and Kilibarda's people's party in Montenegro, were harmonized.

Of course, as followers of the most conciliatory option in Serbian politics Micunovic's Democrats are still in the game. However, sources close to the former tighter DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] claim that in this case this would be a loose national opposition coalition whose only point of contact would be the "Serbian national and state interest and antipathy toward Milosevic." To put it simply, this would mean that DEPOS would return to its "original principles" which also imply a clear national program, allegedly stopped before the last elections).

Another two things are assumed: the political reactivation of academics within DEPOS with at least the indirect support of Dobrica Cosic in the background and the final elucidation of an unclear situation within the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO]. According to this mosaic "the victory of the so-called national option in the SPO would not be necessary but it would be enough for Mr. Draskovic to demonstrate a little less aversion to Karadzic."

Of course, these ideas assume that Radovan Karadzic agrees to such an adventure before the "second stage" ("a union of Serbian lands") is put on the agenda. In any case, if the leader of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina tried in this way to unite the national opposition in Serbia it can already be seen who would be on the opposing side, at least at the initial stage. It seems unbelievable that the SPS, the Serbian Radical Party, the GSS [expansion unknown], and possibly part of the SPO might find themselves together. In the short term, the realistic nature of this variant depends the most on two questions: First, will the Radicals really carry out their threat to the Socialists and second, how will the Geneva peace conference on Bosnia end?

Ministers Discuss 'Economic War' With Montenegro

AU1309202593 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Sep 93 p 4

[Report by D.S.: "Blocking Smuggling or—Montenegro?"]

[Text] Belgrade—We have learned unofficially from the Government of Serbia that talks have been under way for the third day between Radisa Djordjevic and Dusko Lalicevic, [Serbian and Montenegrin] trade ministers, on the flow of food from Serbia to Montenegro. As is well known, these have been prompted by the blocking of a column of trucks containing foodstuffs on the "border" between Serbia and Montenegro at Prijepolje. No one in the Ministry of Trade of Serbia was prepared to comment on these events.

While little is being said on the Serbian side about the whole event—the stopping of the trucks has been interpreted as a way to break smuggling channels, but, according to some sources, Serbia has introduced its own "sanctions" because it had information that the goods that it was sending to Montenegro were being exported to Italy via the port of Bar—the Montenegrin side is getting louder and louder.

It is already being openly said that this involves an economic war, a deliberate action by the authorities in Serbia against Montenegro. Faced with food shortages in its own backyard, they say that Serbia again remembered the decree that was adopted at the beginning of the year, according to which it is impossible to take agricultural-food products out of Serbia without the prior permission of the responsible Trade Ministry.

At a meeting with representatives of the large trading houses in Montenegro, Minister Dusko Lalicevic informed the businessmen that he was on his way to Belgrade (the meeting was held on 3 September in Podgorica) and that, on his return, he would be able to decisively say what Montenegro had at its disposal, in what quantities, what it could acquire from Serbia, and what it would have to import. After these talks, it would be clearer whether there would be a single Yugoslav market, the minister added.

Even the news that has been coming from the traders themselves is contradictory. While, for example, Sreten Bulatovic, director of the "Beograd" department store in Podgorica, says that two of this trading enterprise's trucks had been returned because they did not have special permission from the necessary Serbian organ, Ljubinko Dragojlovic, director of the department store's

import and export sector in Belgrade, told us that the firm had so far been regularly supplying its shops and premises in Montenegro.

That "something" is happening is confirmed by Vojin Djukanovic, president of the Economic Chamber of Montenegro, in a recent statement for BORBA in which he said that, some ten days previously, the Zelezara enterprise in Niksic used steel to pay for flour from a food producer in Serbia. However, four trucks had to be returned, in line with the decree of the Government of Serbia.

[Box, p 4]

"Three-Fold Sanctions"

The border between Serbia and Montenegro has been blocked more for economic than political reasons. Serbia, itself facing shortages, has restricted its food exports while suppliers from Serbia are asking for goods to be paid for at the real and not the "frozen prices" dictated by the economic reform measures.

Assessing that Montenegro is subject to "three-fold sanctions"—of the Security Council and the Federal and Serbian Governments—the opposition Social-Democratic Alliance has announced that it will initiate a debate on this in parliament. This was said in a statement by this party regarding a letter that traders in Montenegro had sent to the republican Trade Ministry.

Official on New Prices, Trade With Montenegro

AU1009204993 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Dragoslav Jovanovic by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Jovanovic] We in the republican government have concluded that a speedy correction of prices of certain products is necessary and have thus carried this out. This correction of prices was carried out for the very reason that the final product that a citizen buys appears with a certain price; however, the prices of these items [imput] had not been regulated and coordinated in advance. It was high time for a decision to be made on new prices. The Serbian Government, therefore, decided to increase the prices of bread, flour, edible oil, sugar, meat products, milk, and mainly agricultural products. It has also decided that the prices for housing services are to be established by communal bodies—that is, city bodies.

One should say here that this decision is also coordinated by other decisions that the government makes occasionally or daily. A few days ago, we made the decision to raise the minimum wage to 11.6 billion dinars. Therefore, this was sort of a preparation exercise. Employed people now have the right to a higher wage so that they can better accept the new prices that we have prepared, the decision on which should be announced today. One reason for this is to remove price disparity. The other reason is to stimulate producers to generate a greater quantity of these goods and, therefore, increase market supplies. I do not think that anyone thinks that our sole interest is to take care of just the basic package for citizens containing sugar, flour, edible oil, and the like but to also ensure that the same goods appear on the market—at a different price, of course, but as a kind of minimum guarantee to citizens. Therefore, I think that the new prices of these and other goods are going to result in increased production.

[Unidentified correspondent] Rumor has it that commodity circulation between Serbian and Montenegro has been banned. Is this true?

[Jovanovic] The truth is that the Serbian Government has made no decision regarding any special control over commodity circulation with Montenegro nor has it taken any special control measures of trade with Montengro. The truth lies in the following: Within all measures of an increased financial and market control, the overall control of commodity exchange has been intensified, particularly in the case of trade and illegal trade with goods that are of special interest for citizens. I think that it is the responsibility of this government to keep a certain quantity of food items for its citizens and not to allow smuggling. To put it simply, control has been increased in all spheres. The only reaction to this is perhaps somewhat more emotional in the case of the neighboring republic. After all, this control of trade exists everywhere.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Jovanovic, there is a lot of talk now about electricity and fuel. Winter is coming soon and we are still under sanctions. What is the Serbian Government going to do with a view of having our citizens spend this coming winter in heated rooms?

[Jovanovic] The approach to these problems with irregular supplies with electricity and fuels is somewhat dramatic. I do not want to say that there are no difficulties and that it is easy to obtain fuel; I can only say that this winter is not going to be as hard as the last one.

Macedonia

Collapse of Economy Foreseen if Sanctions Continue

AU1409103293 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 8 Sep 93 pp 1, 7

[Article by S. Noevski and V. Cvetkovski: "Damage With Long-Term Consequences"]

[Text] The Macedonian economy has been dragged to the edge of the abyss. Whether we want to admit it or not, the sanctions introduced by the UN Security Council against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] are most to blame for the present desperate

situation in the national economy. Our consistency in respecting and implementing these measures, particularly in the last five months, after the enforcement of Resolution 820, has been directly felt by all Macedonian companies. It is possible to expect that, in the years to come, it will be difficult to find an alternative to the economic cooperation that we had with Serbia over decades, because we were, naturally, oriented to it. Therefore, the only conclusion is that respect for the measures for a total isolation of Serbia has brought the Macedonian economy nothing but damage that cannot be compensated, now that it has lost its largest market.

Contrary to official and unofficial critics on the consistent respect for Resolution 820, an undeniable fact is that the production capacities in some vital economic branches have been extinguished. That is the situation in the black and colored metallurgy, in almost all steel-producing centers, where scarcely 10 to 20 percent of capacities are used. We are witnessing the dying- off of trade activities, great losses in the mining industry, damage in travel and tourism. As a result of the sanctions, the social product is marking a drastic fall, whole production plants are being closed down and a number of workers are unexpectedly taking forced leaves, others are being fired.

We can openly say that if the last hermetic closing of the border with our northern neighbor continues, with the meticulous control by the CSCE representatives, there will definitely be a collapse and bankruptcy in the national economy. It is undoubtedly true that the prognosis on $1.8 billion damage in the Macedonian economy by the end of the year due to the sanctions, will come true.

The data saying that 80 percent of Macedonian production went across the territory of Serbia, that our economy sold our northern neighbor products valued at up to $900 million annually, is true. The introduction of the sanctions and the blockade reduced this cooperation, established decades ago, placing it on a minimum level. It is unnecessary to enumerate specifically, because the country's electrical energy system, connected to the Serbian, has no other alternative; the supply of raw materials for metallurgy, especially the supply of dried lignite and coke, offering coal, technologically unsuitable, as a bad alternative. It will mean the closing of the last plants working now at minimum capacity, like "Jugohrom," "Fenimax," the "Iron Industry." It is perfectly well known what it means to provide raw materials from distant markets—the multiplication of transport costs, that we cannot afford to cover financially. Therefore, just in this specific branch it is possible to expect a loss of $900 million, $207 million loss damage due to increased transport expenditures, and an additional $222 million can "go off" due to unrealized transport services. If we add to these the annual assessments for the lost income in agriculture mounting to $1280 million, together with all the other indirect damages, then all those who are in charge of the northern border control insisting on consistent implementation of the sanctions, must be aware of the great damage that these measures can cause to the Macedonian economy.

An Alternative for the Lost Market

The respect for the sanctions and the economic blockade, introduced for the sake of peace, so far away, in the former Yugoslav regions, has another side to the coin, especially because we are not an equal member of the UN. The implication is that the international community must have the same responsibility about our country, at least in moderating the damage already experienced, and that yet to come in our economy. It would be unreal to expect that the mechanism for compensation will act with such speed as to believe that Macedonia will right now receive a whole bunch of dollars from the international community. As a matter of fact, nobody has received such assistance, but it does not mean that Macedonia has not got the right to insist on compensation. In respecting the difficulties we now face, the international community should give its support in finding a replacement for the lost market. Even more so because the economists themselves point to the fact that urgent financial assistance, like credits, help in oil, etc., are not a long-term solution for those companies that need a supply of raw materials and a market for their products. There are no doubts that the UN Sanction Committee can also do a lot in helping the Macedonian economy, especially in the customs area, in providing international licenses, in the area of transport etc.

Nevertheless, it should probably be stated that in general terms the world's experiences demonstrate that no economic blockade over a country has ended with total success. It is of specific importance for us, because the war waged in regions of the former Yugoslavia must be stopped. Then, the question will be, who is going to connect the threads of economic cooperation in the national economies, for decades intermingled.

Activity of Albanians in Macedonia Viewed

AU1409082493 Sofia PODKREPA in Bulgarian 8 Sep 93 p 7

[Interview with Muhamed Halil, coordinator of the parliamentary faction of the Party of Democratic Prosperity and the People's Democratic Party in the Macedonian Assembly, by Tanya Mangalkova and Dinko Draganov; place and date not given: "Radical and Moderate Albanians in Macedonia on Same Course"]

[Text] There are 23 deputies of the Albanian minority in the Macedonian Assembly. They represent two Albanian parties—the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PDP] and the People's Democratic Party [NDP]. Mr. Muhamed Halili is the coordinator of the PDP-NDP parliamentary faction. He was born in 1951 in the village of Dzepciste, in the Tetovo region. He worked as a French language teacher at the Kiril Pejicinovic High School in Tetovo. A few months ago he was included in the Albanian delegation to the CSCE. His speech against admitting the

Republic of Macedonia into this European institution resounded throughout Macedonia. Mr. Halili recently told our representative that the Albanians in Macedonia comprise 45 percent of the population, and therefore they must have the right to form a state. According to Mr. Halili, if the forthcoming census of the Macedonian population shows that Albanians from less than 30 percent of the population, then they should not claim anything more than the status of a national minority.

[PODKREPA] Mr. Halili, is it normal that Macedonia's Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Zuta takes part in Islamic Conference meetings?

[Halili] Look, he did not go there on his own, but according to a decision of the Macedonian Government. He even arrived there at the last moment. It was envisaged that someone else should go there and obtain credits from the Islamic countries, but since Zuta is a Muslim, they sent him, because he fits into the scenery and could obtain credits. This was to the benefit of the Republic of Macedonia. He did not go there to seek credits for the Albanians, but for the entirety of Macedonia. The whole thing was normal.

[PODKREPA] How do you view Nevzat Halili's letter to Kiro Gligorov, in which it is claimed that the Albanians are subjected to national discrimination?

[Halili] I think that this is his right, the right of every citizen to send an open letter. I am not sure whether it was necessary to send the open letter, and I do not want to comment on this matter. Nevertheless, I think that this was his personal opinion.

[PODKREPA] Do you adhere to the opinion expressed in the letter?

[Halili] I do not think that a politician should express his opinion through a letter, because we have a political program and many possibilities to establish contacts with Gligorov. We can always tell him directly what we think. I really cannot guess what prompted the letter.

[PODKREPA] Recently in Gostivar the single-nation Municipal Assembly decided to rename the city streets. Some of the streets were given the names of Ballists—former Albanian fascists. Is this normal?

[Halili] First of all, those are not the names of Albanian fascists, but the names of Albanian revolutionaries, and revival and cultural figures. Second, such a single-nation assembly exists also in Skopje. The Skopje City Assembly is composed only of Macedonians. I do not know whether the Macedonians are a multinational or a single-national entity. If we invoke the issue of renaming streets, then we must stress that in Skopje they decided to rename the streets after Macedonian fascists.

[PODKREPA] Which names?

[Halili] There is a list of names.

[PODKREPA] Yes, but it does not include the names of fascists.

[Halili] Where have you seen names of Albanian fascists?

[PODKREPA] This is what NOVA MAKEDONIJA said.

[Halili] Did you read in NOVA MAKEDONIJA whether there is a single Albanian street name in Skopje?

[PODKREPA] Skopje is another issue. The question is why streets in Gostivar were named after persons who are not from Gostivar or Macedonia, but from Kosovo and Albania?

[Halili] The culture is indivisible. We have the right to use the name of any Albanian who has done something good.

[PODKREPA] You maintain that in Gostivar no streets were named after Baliists?

[Halili] Do you know who Balli was?

[PODKREPA] Perhaps for Albania Balli was a hero or a legend, but for the Macedonians in Gostivar he was a villain and a brigand.

[Halili] And what does it mean for the Albanians in Skopje that not a single street there was named after an Albanian?

[PODKREPA] This will be amended in the future. The question was about Gostivar.

[Halili] This will also be amended there. I can guarantee it that if the situation in Skopje is amended, it will also be amended in Gostivar.

[PODKREPA] Don't you think that this was done on purpose by certain forces, that oppose the PDP-NDP parliamentary faction, insist on conducting a firmer course, and demand the resignation of Mithad Emini, your party's secretary, because he is too meek?

[Halili] Let me tell you that we do not have a "firm" and a "meek" course. We have a single course, and we support what was done in Gostivar. It is a mistake to think that a party secretary could save an entire nation. It is precisely the same mistake we made when we thought that it was impossible without Tito. The same philosophy emerges here; namely, that it is impossible without Muhamed Halili and Mithad Emini. No one has a permanent status in a political party. We value Mithad Emini very much, but this does not mean that a single person can determine the entire course of a party. Our party is not that weak that it should depend on a single person.

[PODKREPA] Nevertheless, you cannot deny that in your party there are leaders who are demanding a more firm and radical course.

[Halili] I do not deny this. There are different manners of thinking, something that is inherent to democracy. However, the course is identical. When a decision is adopted the entire PDP parliamentary group implements it.

[PODKREPA] Is there a conflict between the PDP parliamentary faction and the party leadership?

[Halili] There is no conflict. We function in very harmoniously.

[PODKREPA] What is your view the role of the U.S. troops in the Republic of Macedonia?

[Halili] Their role is to protect U.S. interests.

[PODKREPA] Nevertheless, they are there under UN auspices.

[Halili] Yes, but this is only a uniform. The question is whose interests are they protecting.

[PODKREPA] Do you approve of sending U.S. troops to Macedonia?

[Halili] Did someone ask us when they were sent? If they came to protect the peace, we welcome them, and we prefer to think that they really came to protect the peace.

Montenegro

Report on Severe Shortages of Staple Foods

LD1209122293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1357 GMT 11 Sep 93

[Text] Podgorica, 11 Sep (TANJUG)—The latest decree of the Montenegrin Government, which considerably increased the prices of staple foods four days ago, has not improved the situation on the market. There are still no basic foodstuffs on free sale. Flour, oil, and sugar can be bought only on the black market.

The Montenegrin Government has promised that 156,000 citizens will be able to purchase these goods in special shops, at prices 40 percent lower than market prices. However, the Montenegrin trade union demands that the republican government provide the necessary quantities of staple food for all citizens.

Bread and milk can be bought only early in the morning. It has been noticed that people buy large quantities of bread, especially after they learned that the price of bread in Serbia has doubled. Sales of milk have been limited, and people can buy only two litres of milk in one shop.

Meat is scarce and can be bought only after hours of patient waiting. Processed meats are usually impossible to find, and when they are delivered to a shop the police are called in to keep order.

The government's latest decision to increase prices has cut down on lines only in front of kiosks selling cigarettes. There are enough cigarettes now and no lines of people waiting to buy them, which is easy to understand when one knows that a pack of cigarettes costs 250 million dinars.

Vojvodina

Large Group of Hungarians Seeking To Leave

LD1009175693 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 10 Sep 93

[Text] According to the chairman of the Democratic Community of Hungarians of Vojvodina [VMDK], another large group of Hungarians is preparing to go to Hungary from Vojvodina. Andras Agoston believes that everything possible should be done to make sure that the Hungarians of Vojvodina stay at home. However, the VMDK does not see a way of convincing them to stay.

Therefore, the organization has asked Prime Minister Jozsef Antall to get the Hungarian diplomacy to seek solutions in order to encourage those ready to leave Vojvodina to give up their intention to emigrate.